Hemisphere
Volume 3
Issue 3 Summer

Article 1

1991

Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere
Part of the Latin American Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
(1991) "Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991," Hemisphere: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol3/iss3/1

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Kimberly Green Latin American and Carribbean Center (LACC) Publications Network at
FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hemisphere by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991

This issue is available in Hemisphere: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol3/iss3/1

Hemisphere
A MA G AZ IN E O F L A T IN A M E R IC A N AND C A RI BB EA N AF FA IR S
Summer 1991

Volume Three • Number Three

Seven Dollars

Latin America’s
Burden of Corruption
Mario Diament, Allan Metz

The Politics of Caribbean Music
Daisann McLane, Deborah Pacini Hernandez

Samba World
Andrea Mantell Seidel

Gamier on Free Trade and Central America
Griffith on Free Trade and the Caribbean
Hernandez and Bray on Privatizing Mexican Coffee
Oppenheimer on Boom and Bust in Guatemala
Katz on Bush’s Trade Strategy
O’Connor on Cuba’s Military Quandary
McCoy on Political Challenges in Suriname and Guyana

I

Hemisphere
A MAG AZI NE OF L A T IN A M E R IC A N AND CA RI BB EA N AF FA IR S
Summer 1991

EDITORIAL STAFF
Editor: Anthony P. Maingot
Deputy Editor: Richard Tardanico
Associate Editors: Eduardo A. Gamarra,
Mark B. Rosenberg
Assistant Editor: Sofia A. Lopez
Book Review Editor: Kathleen Logan
Bibliographer: Marian Goslinga
Editorial Assistant: Rene Ramos
Circulation Manager: Raqueljurado
Copy Editor: Michael B.Joslyn
Production Assistants: Michelle Acebo, Cristina
Finlay, Pedro P. Garcia, Teresita Marill, Sontha
Strinko

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Janet M. Chernela
Rodolfo Cortina
Dennis J. Gayle
Jerry Haar
Suzanne Koptur
Raul Moncarz

Dario Moreno
Lisandro Perez
Luis P. Salas
Mark D. Szuchman
Kevin A. Yelvington

Volume Three • Number Three

Seven Dollars

COMMENTARY
Beyond Trade by Leonardo Gamier
The US and Cuba by Anthony P. Maingot

REPORTS
Free Trade and the Caribbean by Winston H. Griffith
Mexico: Campesinos and Coffee by Luis Hernandez and David Bray
Boom, Bust, and Chicle by Andres Oppenheimer
Bush Administration Trade Policy byJulius L. Katz
Cuba’s Military Quandary by Anne-Marie O’Connor
Democratic Transitions? by Terry L. McCoy

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Francisco Rojas Aravena
Ettore Botta
Bernard Diederich
Wolf Grabendorff
Harry Hoetink
Vaughan Lewis
Larissa A. Lomnitz
Abraham F. Lowenthal
Frank Manitzas
Richard Millet
Andres Oppenheim er
Robert A. Pastor

AnthonyJ. Payne
Guido Pennano
Alejandro Portes
Sally Price
David Ronfeldt
Selwyn Ryan
Steven E. Sanderson
Saskia Sassen
Carol A. Smith
Yolande Van Eeuwen
Arturo Villar
Juan Yanes

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published three
times a year (Fall, W inter/Spring, and Summer)
by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of
Florida International University. Copyright © 1991
by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Flor
ida International University. All rights reserved.
Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the
problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin
America and the Caribbean. Responsibility for the
views expressed lies solely with the authors.
EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTIS
ING OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean
Center, Florida International University, University
Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone: (305) 3482894. FAX: (305) 348-3593. Please address manu
scripts and editorial correspondence to the Deputy
Editor.
SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR, and Canada: $20
a year; $36 for two years. Elsewhere: $27 a year;
$50 for two years. Please make check or money
order (US currency only) payable to Hemisphere.
This docum ent was produced at a cost of $7321.67
or $3.66 per copy.

FAXFILE
FEATURES
Latin America’s Burden of Corruption
Corrupt to the Core by Mario Diament
The Israeli-Colombian Connection by Allan Metz
Corruption in Colombia Editorialfrom Semana (Bogota)

The Politics of Caribbean Music
Calypso Politics by Daisann McLane
Merengue: From Race to Gender by Deborah Pacini Hernandez

REVIEW FORUM
Samba World by Andrea Mantell Seidel

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE
Music and Dance by Marian Goslinga

c

0

M

M

E

Beyond Trade
by Leonardo Gamier

resident George Bush’s
Enterprise for the Ameri
cas Initiative offers two
potential gains to the
countries of Latin Amer
ica: increased resources
to finance national investment and
widened access to the North Ameri
can market. From these stand
points, the initiative could be a
step forward for the economies
south of the Rio Grande. Yet only
by learning from the mistakes of
the past can Latin America prevent
this potential opportunity from be
coming merely a new phase in the
old process of impoverishing
growth.

P

Growth with Development
When it comes to examining the
recent past, the neoliberal critique
of Latin American desarrollismo
scores some points. Thus, overval
ued currencies, subsidized interest
rates, excessive protectionism, grow
ing fiscal deficits, and irresponsible
monetary policies are not the kind
of features that lead to economic
development. Nor, I must add, do
the profit margins earned by oli
gopolies.
Central America and its Latin
American neighbors must also

Leonardo Gamier is a professor in the
Maestna en Politico Economica para
Centroamerica y el Caribe at the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, and
a member of the research and policy
institute, Altemativas deDesarrollo.
His recent publications include “Costa
Rica: el proceso de desarrollo y la con
formation del sistema de transportes
(1986-1989) * (San Jose: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Ambientales y
Tecnologicas, October 1990).
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learn from the distant past. The
key lesson from those dimly recol
lected years is this: not all forms of
integration with the world econ
omy perm it the combination of
local economic growth with social
development. In light of current
regional conditions, it is naive to
assume that commercial and finan
cial liberalization and the quest for
macroeconomic balances by them
selves will foster not only the re
sumption of economic prosperity,

The key lesson is that
not allforms of
integration with the
world economy permit
both local growth and
social development.

but also the development of the
economic, political, and social in
frastructure so vital to the region’s
future. In Central America and sim
ilar economic zones in Latin Amer
ica, the fundamental obstacles of
extreme poverty, weak production
capacity, fragile political institu
tions, and scarce financial and en
trepreneurial resources are deeply
entrenched. Unless these obstacles
are addressed, export-oriented
policies and the liberalization of
economic life will lead to impover
ishing growth—much as they did a
century ago.
Concern for these obstacles has
been conspicuously absent from

most of the structural adjustment
programs implemented so far in
Central America and the rest of
Latin America. The Bush initiative
and the bulk of the trade-bloc pro
posal in circulation are no excep
tions. To be sure, such ideas are
promising in terms of widening ac
cess to leading markets. But in
spite of some attention to the fi
nancing of national investment,
the financial measures considered
tend not to transcend a narrow
range of export production and to
be conditioned on the weakening
or dismantling of essential state
supports. Hence, without serious
modification, the implementation
of the Bush initiative and related
plans would fail to address—and,
indeed, could exacerbate—the
structural limitations of the hemi
sphere’s less-developed countries.
Once again, producers through
out Latin America would be com
peting among themselves to sell
their products at increasingly lower
prices on the North American mar
ket. And once again, such competi
tion would not revolve around the
process of enhancing the value of
local productive resources through
the incorporation of advanced
knowledge, technology, skills, or
efficiency. On the contrary, it
would be based on the cheapening
of production through the widen
ing use of low-wage, unskilled labor
and the depletion of the region’s
natural resources. Not only would
this pattern continue to depress
Latin America’s standards of living.
It also would fail to reduce its vul
nerability to technological ad
vances and changes in trade policy
in the US and other developed
countries, which historically have
eroded or undercut the region’s
export markets.

Heightened Competition
Within this framework, the Bush
plan could present Central Amer
ica with a particular problem. By
generalizing many of the advan
tages of the Caribbean Basin Ini
tiative (CBI) to Latin America in
general, the plan could jeopardize
the area’s export opportunities.
This is precisely the case with the
advantages offered to countries
like Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia,
which are of special interest to the
US because of their role in the
drug war; it is also the case with a
US-Canada-Mexico free-trade agree
ment. So far, Costa Rica is the only
Central American country to have
taken advantage of the CBI in any
significant way. In 1984-89 its nontraditional exports increased their
portion of Costa Rica’s total ex
ports from 15% to 40%; in 1989
such exports accounted for only
12 % to 20% of total exports from
the region’s other countries. If not
properly negotiated, trade policies
based on the Bush plan could close
the CBI door in the face of Central
America.
Insofar as it offers widened ac
cess to mjyor international mar
kets, Bush’s Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative is promising
indeed. Nonetheless, for the longrange health of Latin America and
the entire hemisphere, the Bush
plan does not go far enough. What
is also necessary is serious interna
tional commitment—by the US
government, multilateral agencies,
and Latin American governments
themselves—to strengthen the re
gion’s economic, social, and politi
cal infrastructure. Doing so is the
only way to promote growth with
equity and democracy throughout
the Americas. ■
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Commentary

The US and Cuba
by Anthony P. Maingot

o the extent that rational
ity is judgm ent based on a
norm rather than any ab
solute standard of behav
ior, then one is tempted
to call US-Cuban rela
tions irrational. Certainly they ap
pear to run against the norms of
contemporary world practices and
pronouncem ents about pragma
tism and utilitarianism in interna
tional relations. Since the US is far
more prom inent in its power and
foreign policy, the tendency is to
start by analyzing its contradictory
behavior. Compared to US treat
m ent of other international “of
fenders,” there is no doubt that its
policy toward Cuba appears contra
dictory and out of character.
Listen to George Bush defend
the granting of most-favored na
tion trading status to China: “Some
argue that a nation as moral and
just as ours should not taint itself
by dealing with nations less moral,
less just. But this counsel offers up
self-righteousness draped in a false
morality. You do not reform the
world by ignoring it.” In other
words, contacts and trade, not isola
tion and embargoes, are the ways
to bring about the changes you de
sire. This is in the best tradition of
realism in US foreign policy. It ech
oes George F. Kennan saying that
“the practice of government, after
all, is a practical exercise and not a
moral one,” and Dean Acheson re
minding us that “the vocabulary of
morals and ethics is inadequate to
discuss or test foreign policies of
states.” It is George Ball urging
statesmen to avoid “moralistic

T

Anthony P. Maingot is editor of
Hemisphere.
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m ush.” O f course, while there
have been idealists in US history
(such as Woodrow Wilson and
Jimmy Carter), Bush is very much
in the mold of mainstream US for
eign policy tradition. This explains
why the US deals with China and
Syria, and dealt previously with
Panama’s Manuel Antonio Noriega
and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Again,
in Bush’s own words, a successful
foreign policy means charting a
“moral course through a world of
lesser evils.”

Since the Cuban
revolution, the issue
has been one of
clashing US-Cuban
interests, not lack of
communication.
Comparisons with
US-Chinese relations
are revealing.

The Absence of Pragmatism
So why all the apparent moralizing
about Cuba? Is it that, of all the
countries less moral than the US,
only Cuba has crossed the line
from “lesser evil” to “absolute evil”?

The answer is that the moralizing is
only apparent. Separated from its
rhetoric, Bush’s policy towards
Cuba can be explained in terms of
some fundamental realities of con
temporary diplomacy and interna
tional relations. Some comparisons
with China are revealing.
First, there is the personal di
mension. Bush, who headed the
US mission in Beijing for two years,
believes he knows what makes
China tick. A similar personal at
titude is said to govern his relations
with Mexico. There is no evidence
of any such personal sentiments to
wards Cuba. Bush is the eighth con
secutive US president to have sour
relations with Fidel Castro; secret
and not-so-secret missions have
been sent to Cuba by every one of
these presidents, including Ronald
Reagan, who sent General Vernon
Walters to talk to Castro. The issue
has always been one of clashing in
terests, not lack of communication.
While nothing in Bush’s experi
ence with Castro disposes him to
take any initiative in breaking a 32year-old freeze, nothing in his for
eign policy realm compels him in
that direction either.
Bush is not unrealistic in believ
ing that the 1,200 US companies
with $4.2 billion invested in China
and the $ 10 .4-billion trade surplus
China has with the US provide him
with diplomatic leverage. With a
free-enterprise culture quickly de
veloping in South China and with
Hong Kong already established as
the Chinese economy’s new finan
cial center of gravity, Bush legiti
mately sees a slow but sure pace of
change in China.
No such factors are evident in
Cuba. Additionally, US pragmatism
towards China is not an isolated
case. The European Community,

Japan, the USSR, and even Taiwan
are dealing with China. The exact
opposite operates with Cuba. Even
its former allies in Eastern Europe
will trade only in terms of hard cur
rency on the barrel-head, and
those who invest in jo int ventures
in the Cuban tourist industry (i.e.
Spain) are doing so in terms outra
geously advantageous to them
selves.
Trade is not the only arena
where Cuba finds herself isolated.
Former allies who owe Cuban inter
nationalism more than just a debt
of gratitude have quickly forgotten
Cuba’s expenditure of blood and
capital on their behalf. The most
blatant case is that of Angola’s rul
ing MPLA, which, in signing a
peace treaty with archenemy
UNITA, did not even invite the
Cubans to the party in Lisbon. In a
world where even Angola’s ardor
has faded, it is not surprising that,
when it comes to Cuba, there is so
litde international pressure on
Bush to go the extra mile.
Finally, and critically, there is a
fairly wide perception in Washing
ton—and increasingly in Europe
and Latin America—that Cuban
politics and economics have deteri
orated to the stage where there is
little space for diplomacy and bar
gaining. Pragmatism’s operational
code is that nations utilize what
ever leverage they can to achieve
goals. Castro’s own policy of the
“zero option” appears to have re
moved, or at least to have kept wellconcealed, whatever cards he has
to play. Today, as for much of the
past 32 years, the game appears
more like solitaire than poker.

Cuban Stagnation
This dismal scenario is evident in
the discourse in Havana and, as
such, is doing nothing to mitigate
hard-line attitudes in Washington.
The reason is less Castro’s opposi
tion to glasnost and perestroika than
his failure to show flexibility con
cerning blatant realities in Cuba it
self. If a leader will not admit to
evident failures at home—the way

the Chinese leadership has with
their economy—why expect such
admission in international rela
tions?

A wide perception in
Washington—and
increasingly in
Europe and Latin
America—is that
Cuban politics and
economics have
deteriorated to the
stage where there is
little spacefor
diplomacy and
bargaining.

A recent summary of a four-day
retreat of some Cuban leaders dis
cussed their answers to 423 ques
tions ( Granma, May 26,1991). Two
questions in particular—neither
related to foreign policy per se—
seem indicative of Cuba’s ideologi
cal and decisionmaking stagnation.
First, why hasn’t agriculture re
sponded to the needs of the popu

lation? The leaders responded with
a cliche; their explanation was that
international “objective” and “conjunctural” factors combined with
the lingering “negligencies and
bad habits” of the working class to
produce this disappointment. A
more flexible and pragmatic elite
would have gotten more realistic
answers from listening to another
question regarding the low level of
productivity: why are these prob
lems miraculously solved when the
same worker offers his services pri
vately on the black market? Predict
ably the leaders gave no answer.
Rather than attempting to find
clues to US-Cuban relations in ei
ther irrationality or inconsistencies
in the US stance, it might be more
productive to view both sides as re
sponding to 50 years of a very spe
cial (tutelary or imperialist, if you
wish) relationship, followed by 32
years of revolution and hostility.
The resulting set of relations and
attitudes is sui generis.
What, then, is called for? First, it
would seem, is to understand that
nothing nationally, internationally,
or within Cuba compels the US to
cast its relationship with Cuba
within a broader framework of
pragmatism. Second, everything,
nationally and internationally, com
pels Cuba to do just that. We may
not know why Castro does not act
more pragmatically, but there is no
doubt that his failure to do so is
the key to the current stalemate in
US-Cuban relations. ■

H em isphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be
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and length.
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tional University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199;
FAX (305) 348-3593.
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Free Tr ade and t he Caribbean
by Winston H. Griffith

aribbean industries such
tor production. In addition, the US
as garments, electronics,
government may encourage its
and data-processing—
country’s firms that seek inexpen
which the region’s gov
sive, unskilled labor to locate in
ernm ents regard as cru
Mexico, based on the argument
cial to its economic
that doing so will help to reduce
development—are the most likely
the flow of illegal Mexican migra
losers in the creation of a North
tion to the US while boosting Mex
American trade bloc. Such indus
ican demand for US exports.
tries are essentially labor-intensive
assembly operations. They are
dom inated by US firms that have
located plants in the Caribbean to
Mexico will
avail themselves of its inexpensive
out-compete the
labor force in order to enhance
their international competitive
Caribbean not onlyfor
ness. With the formation of a
North American trade bloc, how
unskilled assembly
ever, and the consequent removal
of tariffs on Mexican products,
jobs, but alsofor
many multinational assembly opera
high-tech skilledjobs.
tions will relocate to Mexico, where
labor is even less expensive than in
most of the Caribbean.

C

The Balance Sheet
Wage rates in the Dominican Re
public, Haiti, and a few eastern
Caribbean islands may well be com
petitive with the wage rate of Mex
ico. Nevertheless, the economic
infrastructure of these Caribbean
countries is much inferior to Mex
ico’s, whose transportation and
communication systems are well
integrated with those of the US.
What is more, Mexico is closer to
the US than any Caribbean coun
try, a particular advantage for head
offices that prefer to closely moni-

Winston H. Griffith is associate pro
fessor of economics at Bucknell Univer
sity. His recent publications include
“CARICOM Countries and Appropri
ate Technology, ” World Develop
m ent (June 1990).
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Though Caribbean countries
will probably lose manufacturing in
vestment to Mexico, some observ
ers predict that the region will
capture a significant am ount of
offshore data-processing activities.
The reason, they say, is that Spanish-speaking Mexico cannot com
pete in this sphere with the
English-speaking Caribbean. Ar
guably, however, this assertion ex
aggerates Mexico’s disadvantages.
Rising demand for English-lan
guage fluency in Mexico—which
will occur with the formation of a
North American trade zone—will
likely lead to an increased supply
of English-speaking Mexicans.
Not only will Mexico attract as
sembly operations and unskilled
jobs, but based on its relative advan
tages in economic infrastructure, it
will attract high-technology opera
tions and skilled jobs as well. Ac

cording to Kay R. Witmore, chair
of Eastman Kodak, Mexico’s infra
structure is “more or less up to
Western-world economic capabili
ties” (Financier,; September 1990).
He adds that, when Eastman Ko
dak decided to establish a plant in
Mexico, it hired Mexicans to build
the factory, and that Mexican busi
ness managers are fully competitive
with their US counterparts. Further
more, Mexico’s pool of high-tech
nology labor for such enterprises is
much larger, as well as less expen
sive, than the Caribbean’s. While
Caribbean islands tend to have welleducated work forces, they cannot
compete with Mexico’s in the
realm of large-scale, high-technol
ogy m anagement and production.

Caribbean Strategy
Caribbean governments assert that
the flow of direct foreign invest
m ent into their manufacturing sec
tors is vital to the economic growth
and development of their coun
tries. Insofar as their competitive
edge in the world economy is
based on low wages, however, the
gap is widening between the devel
opm ent of local economic infra
structure and the needs of foreign
manufacturing investors. Govern
ments such as those of Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago have intro
duced policies to reduce the rate of
wage growth and thus enhance
their attractiveness to such invest
ors. Even if these policies do prove
successful in the short run, the
long-run problem is that low-wage,
low-productivity countries cannot
compete with high-wage, highproductivity countries.
The reason for this problem is
that high productivity—based on
advanced technology and skilled

labor—offsets the disadvantage of
high wages by reducing per unit
labor costs. Thus, although wages
are several times lower in the Carib
bean than in the US, the latter’s
manufactured products tend to be
more price competitive. Given
Mexico’s advantages over the
Caribbean in advanced industry—
including skilled labor in greater
numbers and at lower cost—a
North American trade bloc would
lead US firms to transfer many of
their high-technology operations
not to the Caribbean but to Mex
ico. East Asian firms might also by
pass the Caribbean to establish
operations in Mexico, as a point of
entry into the US and Canadian
markets.
The Caribbean would be left,
therefore, to compete with Mexico
and the rest of the Third World for
low-technology, low-skill activities
by continually reducing wages and
increasing other costly incentives
to foreign investors. There lurks
another competitor as well: tech
nological innovation in developed
countries, which threatens to dis
place low-wage export manufactur
ing in the Third World.
What are the implications for
Caribbean agriculture? Though
agriculture has fallen in absolute
and relative importance to the
Caribbean economy as a whole, it
continues to generate substantial
employment and foreign ex
change. In view of the decline of
the region’s traditional mainstays,
sugar and bananas, Caribbean gov
ernm ents have been trying to diver
sify their agricultural exports. They
have done so by taking advantage
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative to
supply the US market with nontraditional fruits and vegetables, par
ticularly during the winter.

The Caribbean, however, is al
ready losing in its competition with
Central and South American agri
culture, and unless a North Ameri
can free-trade accord excludes
agricultural products, the Carib
bean will also be pitted against
Mexico. Moreover, if there are no
restrictions on agricultural trade,
some California farmers may find it
worthwhile to transfer their opera
tions to Mexico when they come to
face water restrictions at home. In
any case, the US may be more in
clined to buy from Mexico than
from the Caribbean, given that US
purchases will strengthen the Mexi
can economy, increase its demand
for US products, and possibly help
to reduce the flow of illegal Mexi
can immigration.
Unlike manufacturing and agri
culture, tourism in Caribbean coun
tries such as Antigua, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Jamaica, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands will probably
be unaffected by a North American
free-trade area. In Caribbean coun
tries where tourism is a major eco
nomic contributor, governments
need to ensure that tourism re
mains internationally competitive.
In addition, they should do what
ever possible to maximize linkages
between tourism and the econ
omy’s other sectors.

Entrepreneurial Alternatives
If a North American free-trade
agreement reduces the flow of for
eign manufacturing investment
into much of the Caribbean, the
region’s chronic unemployment
will be aggravated. Resolving the
unemployment problem through
conventional macroeconomic tools
may be beyond the ability of Carib
bean governments. Since the un

employed must strive to attain the
most basic necessities, we can ex
pect that they will create their own
employment opportunities. What
activities they will engage in, how
ever, cannot be said for sure. In
any case, some of this self-gener
ated activity can help lay the
foundation for a broadened and
reinvigorated entrepreneurial class.
As such a class emerges, Carib
bean governments must be pre
pared to assist its members to
progress beyond the low end of
production. Despite a significant
am ount of garment-sewing in the
Caribbean, few local entrepreneurs
have so progressed. In direct con
trast stand the newly industrialized
countries of Asia, where entrepre
neurs who began at the low end of
the production chain have com
monly advanced—with substantial
state support—to the high end. In
deed, even if the Caribbean should
prove successful in attracting for
eign manufacturing investment,
Asian evidence points to the state’s
role in nurturing such a domestic
entrepreneurial class as crucial to
translating foreign investment into
sustained local development.
The potential losses to Carib
bean countries from the formation
of a North American free-trade
area may force regional leaders to
deepen and broaden the Carib
bean integration movement. So
far, this movement had not moved
beyond the level of a customs
union, and involves only the for
m er British colonies. Not that a
deepened and broadened regional
bloc will, by itself, solve the eco
nomic problems of the Caribbean.
Nevertheless, it may mitigate some
of the adverse consequences of a
North American free-trade agree
ment. ■
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Reports: Trade and Development

Mexico: Campesinos and Coffee
by Luis Hernandez and David Bray

n the fall of 1990 a ship filled
with Brazilian coffee arrived at
Veracruz, Mexico. There was
nothing in Mexico’s new im
port regulations, aggressively
streamlined in a unilateral
rush to promote a free-trade agree
m ent with the US, to stop its entry.
Somebody in the Mexican bureau
cracy got nervous, however, and
the ship was not allowed to unload.
Brazilian coffee is just one of the
many threats to Mexico’s small cof
fee farmers. The collapse of the In
ternational Coffee Agreement in
July 1989, the subsequent dive in
world coffee prices, a severe freeze
in December 1989, and the acceler
ating privatization of the Instituto
Mexicano de Cafe (INMECAFE) have
combined to drive small coffee
farmers into liberalized markets
loaded with debt.
Mexico’s small coffee growers
are not enthusiastic about privatiza
tion, yet some of their organiza
tions, particularly affiliates of the
Coordinadora National de Organiza
tio n s Cafeteleras (CNOC), are ready
to accept its challenges. What they
need, however, are the means to
find a competitive niche in the
international market. Coffee is
Mexico’s third largest generator of
foreign exchange, and an esti
mated 2 million rural Mexicans—
mostly Indian and poor—live off its
production. For them, privatization

Luis Hernandez is the coordinatorfor
Servicios de Apoyo Local al Desarrollo
de Base, A. C., in Mexico City. David
Bray is thefoundation representative
for Mexico with the Inter-American
Foundation. The views presented in this
article are not necessarily those of these
institutions.
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means they must swiftly master the
intricacies of international trade.
They must come to grasp what hap
pens to their coffee once it leaves
their farm gates, and learn to do
whatever is possible to influence
that process.

Intervention: Top-Down
The privatization of INMECAFE,
one of many state enterprises be
ing shed in the neoliberal cam
paign of President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari, dramatically changes
the market context in which small
coffee producers operate. Founded
in 1958 as a technical assistance
and research agency, INMECAFE
expanded in the mid-1970s as one
of the populist initiatives of the
Luis Echevarria administration.
Prior to INMECAFE, marketing
was monopolized by coffee czars
such as the notorious Justo Fer

nandez of Veracruz, who com
m anded a huge network that
bought coffee berries dirt-cheap
from unschooled campesinos living
days from the nearest road. In the
mid-1970s INMECAFE began to
stretch its wings to address this
issue under the direction of Fausto
Cantu Pena. On the international
front, Cantu Pena sought Third
World solidarity in commodity mar
kets, even considering a possible al
liance of coffee-producing nations
with OPEC. In Mexico INMECAFE
actively intervened in the produc
tion and marketing of coffee, or
ganizing small coffee producers to
receive credit and technical assis
tance. It also marketed their crops
for them, freeing many of the small
farmers from the grip of coyotes, the
Mexican term for exploitative inter
mediaries. Cantu Pena himself fell
victim to what he has called “sexen
nial cannibalism”—the corruption

associated with Mexico’s six-year
presidential terms—spending four
years in Reclusorio Norte prison on
charges of corruption. Despite this
setback, INMECAFE continued to
expand. By the harvest cycle of
1980-81, INMECAFE controlled
40% of Mexico’s coffee exports, in
cluding the majority of the campe
sinos' production.
During the 1980s, however,
the hostility of the large exporters
and shifts in state policy caused
INMECAFE’s fortunes to decline.
By the end of the decade its per
centage of Mexico’s coffee exports
had plunged to less than 10 %.
Most tellingly, the vast majority of
its small-farmer clientele had come
to regard INMECAFE as just an
other coyote, while marketing losses
had inflated its debt to some $57
million. An internal report defined
its operations as “highly inefficient,
oversized, with little internal con
trol.” Although the desincorporacion
(the government’s euphemism for
privatization) of INMECAFE was
slated to take place over three to
five years, the organization’s rapid
accumulation of debt has led the
government to accelerate the pro
cess to a matter of months.

Intervention: Bottom-Up
The disappearance of INMECAFE,
accompanied by the destabilization
of the world coffee market, is pro
foundly changing relations be
tween the state, the market, and
small coffee producers. In this con
text, CNOC has emerged as the
major response of the autonomous
campesino organizations. CNOC,
which claims to have 20 affiliated
organizations and nearly 50,000
members, is struggling to learn
how to manage all aspects of coffee
production, marketing, and export
ing. It is also striving to maintain
participatory dynamics in its mem
ber organizations, a challenge no
private exporters have to address.
CNOC is based on organi
zational efforts at the grassroots
level in various states, principally
Chiapas, Guerrero, and Veracruz,

Top: Coffee harvesting in Chiltoyac, Veracruz. Bottom: Coffeeprocessing at El Castillo plant
nearJalapa, Veracruz (Photos by Anne Temes)
since the late 1970s. Activist exten
sion agents, priests, and students
spread throughout the countryside
during the 1970s, trying to reinvigorate Mexican democracy and
to encourage grassroots economic
initiatives. For coffee-producing
campesinos, INMECAFE’s pricing

policies and services provoked pro
tests as well as organizing cam
paigns. Regional organizations
such as the Union de Uniones de
Ejidos in Chiapas and the Union de
Productores del Cafe in Veracruz
formed in the early 1980s around
these issues. In 1982 the Union de
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Productores mobilized 10,000 coffee
producers for a series of demonstra
tions capped by an occupation of
the INMECAFE offices.
Rural organizational traditions
perm itted these groups to mobilize
forces rapidly, enter into confronta
tions audaciously, and negotiate
short-term gains. Nevertheless,
they did not help in the methodi
cal, long-term task of building a sus
tainable organization. Not until the
late 1980s did the most advanced
groups begin to carry out locally
controlled rural development pro
grams. These involved alternative
health care, services for women,
road construction, and provision of
electricity, which complemented
basic efforts to take direct control
of the production and marketing
of coffee.
In 1988 these regional organi
zations began to form a national
network around their common con
cern with coffee. A meeting of cof
fee producers at the Universidad
Autonoma de Chapingo in October
1988 led to the first negotiations be
tween INMECAFE and a represen
tative group of producers speaking
as a national organization. In July
1989 the first national meeting of
coffee organizations was held in
Lachiviza, Oaxaca, which resulted
in the signing of the Convenio de
Unidad y Action by 25 organizations
in six Mexican states. In the same
month, CNOC opened an office in
Mexico City.
The nascent national organiza
tion was immediately shaken by the
rupture of the International Coffee
Agreement in July 1989 and the
consequent downward slide of cof
fee prices. These events shoved
CNOC into a struggle on multiple
fronts: to improve the quality and
marketing of its product; to gain
legitimacy with the Mexican govern
ment; and to consolidate demo
cratic organizations.
In CNOC’s second national
meeting, held in Chiltoyac, Vera
cruz, in October 1989, the organi
zation articulated three lines of
action: producer participation in
decisionmaking on the restruc
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turing and desincorporatidn of
INMECAFE; use of a trust fund
collected from a tax on coffee ex
ports (now called Fideicomiso del
Cafe [FIDECAFE]) to support the
collection and marketing of coffee;
and the establishment by CNOC of
a national exporting firm working
on behalf of small coffee farmers.
In January 1991 CNOC directly ex
ported coffee produced by its mem
bers, following the example of the
several regional organizations that
had been exporting for several
years. Later that year, CNOC began
to market its own brand of toasted
coffee, Aztec Harvests, in the US.
Several of the affiliated organiza
tions have been expanding produc
tion in organic coffee, looking for
new market niches and ecologically
sound production techniques.

In spite of CNOC’s major
strides, the task it faces could well
prove overpowering. For example,
it appears that FIDECAFE will be
come just another line of credit,
out of reach for most small farm
ers. Moreover, though the Salinas
government has announced plans
to turn over INMECAFE’s infra
structure to the campesino organi
zations, it refuses to confront the
issue that most concerns them:
their debts, or the fact that most of
INMECAFE’s coffee-processing
plants are too large for the campe
sino organizations to manage. In
the meantime, most small coffee
producers remain, at best, ineffec
tively organized. Undoubtedly it is
the small growers who will be the
biggest losers in the privatization of
Mexico’s coffee industry. ■
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Boom, Bust, and Chicle
by Andres Oppenheimer

or many decades,
Uaxactun, a jungle village
in the heart of Guate
mala’s tropical forest, had
only one source of in
come: its people sold
chicle from the area’s trees to ma
jo r US chewing-gum companies. In
recent years, however, a shift to syn
thetic gum by manufacturers has
brought havoc to Uaxactun and
nearby hamlets. ‘Things are not
what they used to be,” lamented
Jose Mendoza Enriquez, 74, who
began extracting chicle for the
Chicago-based Wrigley Company
more than 20 years ago. “When
Wrigley left, the world came to a
sudden end for us.”
This remote village about 375
miles north of Guatemala City
once had a landing strip where
cargo planes from the capital came
several times a m onth to pick up
the gum shipments. There also was
a general store. The Aviateca air
line office in the village had a radio
transmitter, which residents could
use to seek help in emergencies. At
one point, there was even talk of
bringing electricity, water, and per
haps a telephone line to Uaxactun.
Today, Uaxactun’s main links to
civilization are gone. The village
consists mainly of two rows of
wooden shacks divided by an emp
ty grass field that was once the air
strip. The general store has been
converted into a town hall. The
radio transmitter has disappeared—
nobody knows how or where. The
dirt road to the nearest town,
Tikal, is flooded most of the year.
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Andres Oppenheimer, a member of
H em isphere’s editorial advisory
board, is a Latin America correspon
dentfor the Miami Herald.

About 125 families live in
Uaxactun, many of them immi
grants from even more remote ju n 
gle villages that also were hurt by
the gum crisis. Some continue ex
tracting chicle for a Japanese chew
ing-gum firm. Many have switched
to marijuana cultivation to make a
living.

A government worker who re
cently established a forest conserva
tion outpost in a neighboring zone
said the place “looked like a ceme
tery” when he arrived. ‘T here were
about 60 shacks, which were aban
doned or destroyed,” he said.
“Some of the people had migrated
south to Uaxactun, others had
gone north to Mexico.”
The chicleros—as the men who
climb the trees to extract gum are
known—have long been the most
respected men in their communi
ties. To get the chicle, they have to
go deep in the jungle during the
rainy season, when the acrazapota
tree produces the most sap, defy
ing torrential rains and snakes.
Then they transport the chicle on
mule back to the nearest town—
often a three or four-day trip
through the jungle.
There are an estimated 2,000
chicleros left in Guatemala’s Peten

region, down from more than
10.000 two decades ago, officials
say. Guatemala’s chicle exports
have dropped from 5 million
pounds in the 1930s to about
950.000 pounds in 1990. Virtually
all of Guatemala’s chicle exports
go to Japan. Companies there are
sticking to natural materials to pro
duce a “gourm et gum ” that is more
expensive but tastes better than the
synthetic one, Guatemalan officials
say.
A spokesman for Wrigley says
the firm switched to synthetic gum
in 1981. ‘T he price of chicle got to
such a high level that it became
prohibitive for us to use it,” he said.
Guatemalan forest officials are
hoping to boost chicle sales in
Japan and Europe, banking on the
world trend toward natural foods.
They say the chicleros are the best
guarantee to stop the destruction
of Guatemala’s tropical forest by
lumber companies and squatters
who torch trees to clear land for
their crops. ‘T h e chiclero cuts the
tree, but doesn’t kill it,” said San
tiago Billy, an official with the Gua
temalan government’s natural
resources agency CONAMA. “He
knows the tree will recover in five
years, and that he will be able to
use it again then.”
But in Uaxactun, few expect
the good old days of “La Wrigley,”
as the company was known here,
to come back. “Nobody comes here
anymore,” said Mendoza Enriquez,
the old-time chiclero who now runs
a 47-man crew extracting chicle
in Uaxactun. ‘This place is
doom ed.” ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission
from an article published in the Miami
Herald (December 4, 1990).
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Bush Administration Trade Policy
byJulius L. Katz

resident George Bush’s
speech of June 27,1990,
laid out an ambitious
long-term program for
trade liberalization in the
hemisphere. Over the
months since the speech, we [the
Bush administration] have been
consulting with members of Con
gress, business, labor, and other in
terested groups in the US, and with
the Latin American nations con
cerned, to begin the process of im
plementing the Initiative. We have
reached some preliminary conclu
sions about our basic approach
and developed criteria for im
plementing the policy.

P

(FTA) with Mexico and Canada
will come first. Mexico is by far our
largest trading partner in Latin
America, and a close neighbor with
which we share many economic in
terests. As Bush stated in announc
ing the participation of Canada in
the North American free-trade
negotiations, such an agreement
would be “a dramatic first step to
ward the realization of a hemi
spheric free trade zone.” We would
expect that whatever innovations
in form or scope of a FTA that we
develop in the North American
free-trade process would be carried
over to the later Enterprise for the
Americas agreements as well.

Implementing the Initiative
O ur approach has five main tenets.
First, the US remains committed to
the multilateral trading system.
The success of the Uruguay Round
is of the utmost importance to our
free-trade initiatives in the hemi
sphere. The US cannot be the only
market for Latin America, and out
wardly oriented, competitive eco
nomic policies are the best
guarantee of continuing growth
and development. The Uruguay
Round must also be the venue for
dealing with the agricultural Gordian knot, which certainly cannot
be solved in the Western Hemi
sphere alone. We anticipate that a
failure of the Round would lead to
an atmosphere far more conducive
to protectionist and unilateral solu
tions and more skeptical of trade
liberalization.
Second, the proposed negotia
tions on a free-trade agreement

Julius L. Katz is the deputy US trade
representative.
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The US cannot be the
only marketfor Latin
America, and
outwardly oriented
policies are the best
guarantee of regional
development.

Third, we are proceeding to con
clude framework agreements on
trade and investment with those
countries and groups of countries
that wish to work toward freer
trade in the hemisphere. In fact,
we began the trade liberalization
process with Mexico in 1987 with
the signing of just such a frame
work agreement. Completion of a
framework agreement with a coun
try or group of countries does not
imply that the US will be proposing

free-trade negotiations with such
countries immediately, but it does
establish a channel to explore vari
ous trade liberalization options
and promote the Enterprise for the
Americas vision.
Fourth, and perhaps least appre
ciated, we see the creation of a freetrade area for the hemisphere as
taking many years and stretching
into the next decade. The commit
m ent to open markets completely
and on a reciprocal basis is a diffi
cult one for any government to
make. We know there will be many
complications in negotiating such
arrangements between the US and
other countries in the hemisphere.
As we explore possible opportuni
ties and consider approaches, we
believe it is essential to maintain a
close consultative relationship with
Congress.
Fifth, we should be prepared to
negotiate with individual countries
and in particular with groups of
Latin American or Caribbean
countries that associated to re
move trade barriers among them
selves. President Bush made this
point in his June 27,1990, speech.
“.. . [T]he US stands ready to
enter into free trade agreements
with other markets in Latin Amer
ica and the Caribbean—particu
larly with groups of countries that
have associated for purposes of
trade liberalization.”
From the US perspective, nego
tiating with an integrated, fully
open market created by a num ber
of contiguous countries is attractive
because it will provide us with ac
cess to a larger market and move
us towards regional integration.
This does not rule out concluding
bilateral agreements where these
are appropriate (e.g., Chile). Bilat
eral agreements can be a model

and incentive for other countries
to undertake needed reforms. Our
overall objective remains to encour
age countries in this hemisphere to
increase trade among ourselves
and reduce barriers to subregional
trade as part of the overall process
of promoting free trade through
out the hemisphere.

Indicators of Readiness
Regarding the timing and pace of
negotiations, a variety of economic
and political factors will affect our
recommendations. Again, I want to
emphasize that any decisions to
proceed will not be taken without
consultations with Congress and, in
particular, with the members of
this committee.
To be a realistic candidate, a
country or countries must have the
institutional capacity to fulfill the
long-term, serious commitments in
volved, and the economic policies
required for the success of the
FTA. In particular, we would ex
pect that a prospective partner be
committed to a stable macroeco
nomic environment and market-ori
ented policies before negotiations
begin.
Another aspect of readiness is a
country’s commitment to the multi
lateral trading system. We have
been clear that we will only nego
tiate agreements fully consistent
with the provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
To ensure this linkage between
GATT and the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, we will look to
see that our prospective FTA part
ners have demonstrated progress
in achieving open trade regimes
and that they are members in good
standing of GATT. Such a policy
will also be helpful in assuring our
nonregional trading partners that
the Enterprise for the Americas Ini
tiative is in their interest as well. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts of testi
mony before the Committee on Finance,
US Senate, April 24, 1991.
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Cuba’s Military Quandary
by Anne-Marie O ’Connor

he Cuban military has
quietly retired more than
200 officers from a force
with strong ties to a war
hero executed by firing
squad in 1989 on cocaine
trafficking charges. Some believe
the retirements were the most re
cent purge of officers linked to
Major General Arnaldo Ochoa
Sanchez, who was executed with
three other officers. Ochoa en
joyed tremendous popularity
among many officers of the socalled Ejercito Occidental—Cuba’s
most powerful military force—
which he commanded.
Some also speculated that the
charismatic 57-year-old general
could have become a threat to Cu
ban leader Fidel Castro. Rumors
that he and other officers were bid
ding for power persist in Havana.
“They’re getting rid of everything
that smells of Ochoa,” said a mid
level Cuban government official re
lated to a recently ousted colonel.
“It appears to have been a
purge,” a European diplomat said.
‘T h e same has not happened in
any of Cuba’s other armies.” No
revolutionary general alive more
personified the image of the ro
mantic, dashing “intemacionalista”
than Ochoa, who Castro honored
as a “Hero of the Cuban Republic”
in 1984. In 1987-88 Ochoa com
m anded Cuban forces assisting
Angola’s Marxist regime in its civil
war against US and South Africanbacked rebels. That is why the re
tirements in the Ejercito Occidental
attracted so much diplomatic atten
tion, particularly since they ap-

T

Anne-Marie O’Connor is a Latin Amer
ica and Caribbean correspondentfor
Cox Newspapers.
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peared to mainly affect officers
who had served in Africa.
In July 1990 Cuba’s state-run
Radio Rebelde reported that more
than 100 officers from the Ejercito
Occidental were retired. According
to Radio Rebelde, in January 1991
another group of officers was re
tired, 70% of whom had served
abroad. It mentioned that 109 dis
tinguished service medals were
passed out, indicating that at least
that num ber of officers left army
life.

An overriding concern
is sustaining Cuba’s
enormous military
machine.

In the opinion of one Latin
American diplomat, military cut
backs are to be expected with the
end of the Angola conflict, particu
larly since the Cuban military was
greatly expanded in the 1970s and
1980s to play a role in that conflict.
That does not, however, explain
why the cuts are being made in
only one sector. “It’s probable that
there were people tied to Ochoa
among them ,” said the diplomat,
who represents a country that
has friendly relations with Cuba.
“Ochoa had top commands in An
gola and Ethiopia for a long time,
and strong loyalties form under
such circumstances. He galvanized
the discontent of a certain group
of officers, and his credentials—as
a hero of the revolution and a mili

tary commander—were very good.
Ochoa was a threat to power, and
Fidel is power. ”
The announcem ent of the re
tirements followed an intriguing
editorial in the June 1990 issue of
Bastion, the Cuban army’s official
magazine. The article concerned
an internal review of “general prob
lems of military discipline in the
armed forces.” It also promised to
“expose” deficiencies within the
ranks, and that these shortcomings
would be “identified with names
and surnames, which will facilitate
measures for eradicating them .”

Supporters Remain
Even Castro’s close allies were
shocked by the court-martial and
executions of Ochoa and the three
other officers, the biggest domestic
scandal since the 1959 revolution.
There are still supporters of the
Cuban revolution who privately de
fend Ochoa, claiming he was not
involved in drug trafficking for per
sonal gain. “He did it all for the
Ejercito Occidental—so they could
live better, and have things like
tape players and televisions,” said
one government official who knew
Ochoa personally. ‘T h e revolution
only addresses people’s spiritual
needs, but they have material
needs as well.”
Eliminating Ochoa and other
potential challenges within the
military is only one of Castro’s
concerns. An overriding concern
is sustaining the enormous Cuban
military machine. Several problems
are already quite apparent.
Like many US Vietnam veterans,
Cuban soldier Victor Puentes was
frustrated and bitter at his fate
when he completed his combat
tour in Angola. Puentes, 24, volun

teered for duty in Angola in 1987
because he thought it would help
him overcome a bad high school
record that left him only two ca
reer choices: the police or the
military. When he was wounded by
rebel shelling and decorated, he
was certain he would attain his
goal: admission to the Havana uni
versity program that would train
him in government administration.

Dashed Dreams
Puentes’s dream began to crumble
during the three months he spent
in a mental hospital for treatm ent
for shell shock. “We were all doped
up. They gave me modeling clay to
play with, as if I was some kind of a
nut. I just threw mine at the wall,”
he said. When he returned to Cuba
in 1989, he was again offered a
common path for poor students:
a job as a policeman. Dispirited,
Puentes now works occasional con
struction jobs.
Puentes, like more than half of
the Cuban troops who served, is
black. He believes his treatm ent is
a symptom of racial prejudice.
“This is not fair,” he fumes, sitting
in his sparse room in a colonial
multifamily dwelling on a narrow
Havana street. ‘They say racism was
eradicated by the revolution, but
this shows it still exists.”
O ther Angola veterans content
edly accept the high pay and perks
offered to the corps of privileged
hard hats building tourist hotels
and the sports complex for the
summer 1991 Pan American
games. It beats life as a cop or a
farm worker. Luis Angel Garcia, a
member of the elite Bias Roca con
struction brigade, makes as much
in salary as some senior govern
m ent officials by building Spanishfinanced tourist hotels. He does
not enjoy the same fringe benefits,
like a car or roomy apartment.
Even so, he does not share other
veterans’ frustrations. “I ’m a com
plete revolutionary,” Garcia said,
“and I stand by everything (Cuban
leader Fidel) Castro says. If the
Yankees invade, I will grab a gun

and fight.” Another Bias Roca mem
ber, Nicolas Leiva, 29, said service
in Angola was “a true school of life”
that deepened his commitment to
the revolution.
Francisco Diaz, a 38-year-old cab
driver and Angola veteran of an
other generation, said veterans
who complain today are too young
to know the difficulties of life in
the first years of the revolution and
understand the advances that have
been made. “They had it easy in An
gola. They gave them tape players,
music, good food, and nice places
to stay,” said Diaz, shaking his
head. “It was a true sacrifice for the
troops when I was there. These
kids are spoiled.”
These personal accounts reflect
the story at the level of the average
Cuban citizen: it is a complex situ
ation with mixed emotions that
makes prediction difficult. The
macroeconomic realities, however,
are more severe and will surely
have an impact on the military.

A Step Backward
As Cuba struggles to cope with
changes in the communist world,

it is facing another challenge at
home—finding jobs for the thou
sands of Angola veterans who have
returned to a country beset by se
vere economic crisis and drastically
reduced opportunities for nearly
everyone. Cuban economic plan
ners are grappling furiously with
the backlash caused by the switch
to free-market trade by former so
cialist allies. Thousands of workers
have been laid off from state enti
ties that are to be reduced by as
much as 80%, and diminished
Soviet oil shipments have forced
factory closures.
“The two principal problems in
Cuba are the youth and the mili
tary,” said a European diplomat.
‘They take people returning from
Angola and put them to work in
agriculture. Cutting (sugar) cane
far away from home isn’t exactly
what a captain had in mind, espe
cially after a privileged life as an of
ficer with a driver and assistants. It
is a very serious problem, not be
cause it could foment a civil war,
but because it forms a very large
base of social pressure at a time
when industries are closing facto
ries to save petroleum .” ■
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Democratic Transitions?
by Terry L. McCoy

uriname and Guyana
share the same ambigu
ous condition: they are in
South America but not of
it. With populations of
___ 1_. O C A f\f\f\ _____ ] < 7 C A A A A

respectively, these two nations are
the smallest on the continent, and
their histories have rendered them
even more marginal. They are the
creations of Dutch and British colo
nialism respectively, and are pop
ulated largely by the descendants
of African slaves and indentured
Asians imported as plantation
laborers. Independence came in
1966 for Guyana, nine years later
for Suriname.
Political developments in Suri
name and Guyana in the late 1970s
and most of the 1980s also ran
counter to what was happening
elsewhere in South America. In
stead of moving toward democracy,
they headed in the opposite direc
tion. Suriname fell to military rule,
while Guyana stagnated under a
one-party regime. By the late 1980s
political openings appeared in
both countries. Liberalization con
tinues, but functioning democra
cies are not assured.

Suriname
Of the two, Suriname’s transition
to democracy has been the more
problematic. Its armed forces
seized power on Christmas Eve of
1990. Although they promised to
hold elections within 100 days,
skepticism regarding their real

Terry L. McCoy is a political scientist
and director of the Centerfor Latin
American Studies at the University of
Florida. He has written extensively on
the Caribbean.
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character and intentions was well
deserved since they had issued sim
ilar pronouncem ents in August
1980. At that time the army and its
leader—Sergeant Desi Bouterse—
overthrew the government, promis
ing to end feuding and corruption
and to return Suriname quickly to
civilian hands. Instead Bouterse as
sumed the presidency and pre
sided over seven years of political
repression and economic misman
agement, the latter being carried
out under the banner of Third
World socialism. During the holi
days of Christmas 1982 the regime
apprehended, tortured, and then
m urdered 15 of its opponents.
The people of Suriname re
sponded to the Christmas massa
cre, the deteriorating economic
situation, and a Maroon rebellion
in the interior by leaving in large
numbers. International attention,
and pressure, was not long in com
ing. The Dutch, who had quietly
supported Bouterse’s takeover, sus
pended their large development
aid package in 1984, while Washing
ton expressed its unhappiness over

Bouterse’s warm relations with
Cuba and Libya. The alleged ties of
the regime to cocaine trafficking
also aggravated relations with the
US. In the face of a growing Cuban
presence on the South American
continent, both Venezuela and Bra
zil joined the diplomatic campaign
against Bouterse. The escalating ex
ternal pressure, plus Bouterse’s de
lusion that he was in fact popular,
led him to hold an election at the
end of 1987. The organization
formed to promote his candidacy—
the New Democratic Party—was
soundly defeated by the New
Front, a coalition of traditional
ethnic parties.
Despite losing the election,
Bouterse retained much of his
power, and the civilian government
that was inaugurated in January
1988 was forced to name him com
m ander of the armed forces.
Bouterse proceeded to undercut
the badly divided civilian authori
ties at every turn and to intimidate
the civilian population. When the
ruling New Front rejected his call
in late 1990 to incorporate the

armed forces into the cabinet,
Bouterse mobilized his troops to
remove the constitutional govern
ment.

Guyana
The news from neighboring Guya
na is somewhat more encouraging,
in spite of the country’s tenuous
history of democracy. Since inde
pendence, Guyana has been locked
in the suffocating embrace of the
People’s National Congress (PNC).
Forbes B urnham ’s PNC came to
power with covert assistance from
the US and Britain, both of whom
feared another electoral victoryb

fair vote since the East Indians
hold numerical superiority over
the Creoles represented by the
PNC. But the opposition and Guya
nese in exile have been effective in
mobilizing external pressure on
the government to take the final
steps toward elections. A break
through occurred when Hoyte
agreed to a visit by former US pres
ident Jimmy Carter in October
1990. Asked to serve as an inter
national observer, Carter insisted
on a firsthand examination of the
electoral system.
The Hoyte government’s agree
m ent to undertake the two reforms
recom mended by Carter—a house-
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by Prime Minister George Price of
Belize, helped clear the remaining
obstacles to acceptable elections in
the fall of 1991.

Point of Departure
Suriname and Guyana are both
at critical points in their political
development. Elections do not
guarantee good government, but
without them the two countries are
guaranteed the continuation of
bad governments. International
concern and pressure have been
instrumental in moving Guyana to
ward genuinely meaningful elec
tions for the first time in its history.
utiny was likewise decijng the armed forces of
3 honor its pronounce;ctions. Held on May
ey returned Suriname
ule. The international
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officials be given the
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Reports: Politics

Democratic Transitions?
by Terry L. McCoy

uriname and Guyana
share the same ambigu
ous condition: they are in
South America but not of
it. With populations of
only 360,000 and 750,000
respectively, these two nations are
the smallest on the continent, and
their histories have rendered them
even more marginal. The
creations of Dutch and B
nialism respectively, and
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armed forces into the cabinet,
Bouterse mobilized his troops to
remove the constitutional govern
ment.

Guyana
The news from neighboring Guya
na is somewhat more encouraging,
in spite of the country’s tenuous
history of democracy. Since inde
pendence, Guyana has been locked
in the suffocating embrace of the
People’s National Congress (PNC).
Forbes Burnham ’s PNC came to
power with covert assistance from
the US and Britain, both of whom
feared another electoral victory by
Cheddi Jagan, the Marxist leader
of Guyana’s East Indians. Ironically
it was Burnham who led Guyana
down a radical path, declaring it a
“cooperative socialist republic” and
establishing warm relations with
the socialist bloc. Operating be
hind a thin facade of parliamentary
democracy, Burnham resorted to
intimidation, gerrymandering, and
electoral fraud to keep himself and
the PNC in power.
When Burnham died in 1984,
he was succeeded by his first vice
president and prime minister,
Hugh Desmond Hoyte. The coun
try Hoyte inherited has continued
to decline economically. The real
per capita income of Guyana is
lower in 1991 than it was in 1960.
The capital city of Georgetown is in
a state of advanced physical decay
with crumbling buildings, frequent
power outages, and endemic street
crime. Tens of thousands of Guya
nese have emigrated, settling in
the US and Canada. In desperate
need of international assistance,
Hoyte moderated the policies of
his predecessor, adopting more
market-oriented economic policies
and liberalizing the political cli
mate.
Yet the Hoyte government re
sisted the free and fair elections de
m anded by opposition politicians,
who pointed out that Hoyte’s man
date rested on the rigged elections
of 1985. It was assumed that elec
toral opponent Jagan would win a

fair vote since the East Indians
hold numerical superiority over
the Creoles represented by the
PNC. But the opposition and Guya
nese in exile have been effective in
mobilizing external pressure on
the government to take the final
steps toward elections. A break
through occurred when Hoyte
agreed to a visit by former US pres
ident Jimmy Carter in October
1990. Asked to serve as an inter
national observer, Carter insisted
on a firsthand examination of the
electoral system.
The Hoyte government’s agree
m ent to undertake the two reforms
recom mended by Carter—a houseto-house voter enumeration to up
date registration lists and the
counting of ballots at the polling
place instead of at a central loca
tion—gave hope that the way had
finally been cleared for national
elections acceptable to all parties.
Though the government subse
quently appeared to maneuver to
scuttle the possibility of honest elec
tions, a second international mis
sion in March and April 1991, led

by Prime Minister George Price of
Belize, helped clear the remaining
obstacles to acceptable elections in
the fall of 1991.

Point of Departure
Suriname and Guyana are both
at critical points in their political
development. Elections do not
guarantee good government, but
without them the two countries are
guaranteed the continuation of
bad governments. International
concern and pressure have been
instrumental in moving Guyana to
ward genuinely meaningful elec
tions for the first time in its history.
Outside scrutiny was likewise deci
sive in forcing the armed forces of
Suriname to honor its pronounce
m ent on elections. Held on May
25,1991, they returned Suriname
to civilian rule. The international
community must now insist that
the elected officials be given the
power to govern, an essential step
toward the synchronization of local
political currents with regional
democratic transitions. ■

M exican Academ ic Clearing House
(MACH)
Materiales Academicos de Consulta
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.
• M AC H sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books
and serials, including government publications.
• M AC H handles selective blanket order services for
academic libraries.
• M AC H gives free referral service and periodical book
lists.
Write for further information to MACH, Apartado Postal 13-319, Delegation
Benito Juarez, 03500 Mexico, D.F. Telephone numbers (915) 674-05-67 and
(915) 674-07-79. Fax number (915) 673-62-09.
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Abortion Follow-Up

Fidel: “Just Say No”

On the heels of the state of
Chiapas’s decision to legalize
abortion in December 1990, an
other Mexican state is debating the
legalization of abortion. Officials in
the state of Quintana Roo recently
introduced a new abortion law that
was opposed, not surprisingly, by
the Catholic Church and the rightwing Partido Action National. An un
expected objection came, however,
from the leftist Partido de Revolution
Democratica (PRD). According to
the Latin American Weekly Report
(March 21, 1991), the PRD joined
the conservative anti-abortion coali
tion out of fears that the new law
would not prevent veterinarians
from issuing the medical certificate
required as a prerequisite for an
abortion.

Readers across the US are receiv
ing a flyer advertising a new publi
cation: the “End of the Cuban
Connection.” Nothing unusual
about that, except that it isn’t from
Random House, H arper & Row, or
even the Council on Drug Abuse.
It’s from Havana’s Jose Marti Pub
lishing House. The publication is
the Cuban government’s explana
tion of the trial and execution of
much-decorated General Arnaldo
Ochoa—a “hero of the revolution,”
no less—who was implicated in nar
cotics trafficking by Fidel Castro
himself. The flyer declares that Cas
tro has been “extremely puritani
cal” about drugs, and goes on to
paint the Cuban leader as the origi
nal “just say no” kind of guy. “Fidel
gets high on revolution, Cuban
rum and his own rhetoric,” claims
the circular, leaving readers to won
der if the items are in the right
order.

■

Caribbean AIDS
“AIDS in the Caribbean,” pub
lished in Courier (March-April
1991), surveys the impact of, and
attitudes toward, AIDS in the
English-speaking Caribbean. The
author, Elizabeth White, points out
the general population’s hesitance
to use condoms as protection
against the spread of the disease.
According to White, “. .. it is still
common to hear a man or woman
say that they will now use a con
dom with their ‘outside m an /
woman’ but that they are reluctant
to use one with their ‘main m an /
woman’ as this would indicate to
their partner that they have an out
side relationship or that they sus
pect that their partner has one.”
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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from their Hialeah, Florida, apart
ment. The father told the Herald
(June 15,1991), “To be exploited,
to live poorly and barely get by, I
can do that in my own land and
with my family.”

Sweet Exports
The Banco Central of Nicaragua is
now publishing the monthly Nica
ragua Economic Report. According
to the inaugural edition (March
1991), the publication provides “a
window on events and activities in
both the public and private sectors
which are transforming the eco
nomic system of our nation.” What
are the agents of the economy’s
transformation? The Report ob
serves that melons will be the first
Nicaraguan export to the US since
1985. More than 1,200 acres of
honeydew and cantaloupe were
scheduled to be exported to the
US market in the late spring of
1991.

There’s No Place like Home
Even as the num ber of rafters
leaving Cuba and safely arriving
in South Florida has catapulted
from 467 in all of 1990 to more
than 1,000 so far during 1991,
some rafters are trying to return to
Cuba. One rafter, who survived the
Florida Straits crossing in May
1990, is jobless and sleeps in a
friend’s 1981 Chevrolet. The refu
gee told the Miami Herald (June 14,
1991), “I’ve applied for jobs every
where, but no one calls. T here’s
nothing. I won’t steal, so I prefer to
go back to Cuba.” A father, who ar
rived by raft in April 1990, and his
son, who arrived a month later, are
both jobless and facing eviction

Spring Cleaning
Built in Mexico in 1933, the 18th
of March refinery accounted for
about 7% of the country’s oil refin
ing capacity. But it also accounted
for about 88,000 tons of contami
nants into the city’s thin, smogchoked air. To illustrate his
commitment to fighting air pol
lution, Mexican president Carlos
Salinas de Gortari ordered an im
mediate shutdown of the refinery
on March 18,1991. His next target
will be the city’s 40,000 taxis, all of
which will be fitted with catalytic
converters in the next two years.

Terminator

£N o hay huevos rancheros?

The Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has
published a critique of the Na
tional Endowment for Democracy
(NED) (April 17,1991). The cri
tique asserts that NED needs closer
oversight from Congress because
of the organization’s inability to
provide systematic and thorough
reviews of its grantees. According
to COHA, NED has “conducted
backdoor operations” and uses a
“secretive m anner.” COHA’s solu
tion? It endorsed a bill (H.R. 117)
filed by Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) that mandates the
“term ination” of NED to avoid wast
ing taxpayer dollars “on a leftover
dinosaur from the past days of the
evil em pire.”

Responding to changing demo
graphics in the US, McDonald’s is
now adding breakfast burritos and
chicken fajitas to its fast-food
menu. According to one fast-food
market research firm, restaurant
sales of Mexican food grew at a
compounded rate of 8.6% during
the late 1980s, or about four times
as fast as the sale of hamburgers.
Taco Bell is leading the Mexican
fast-food charge. The company’s
sales grew by 19% in 1990.

Hernan Cortez, by Oliver Stone
Movie director Oliver Stone has
tapped US actor Willem Dafoe as
the star for his new film project on
Hernan Cortez, the Spanish con
quistador. The new project will be
supported by the government of
Mexico and the Comision National
of Spain, and is one of 12 cinema
projects being sponsored by the
Sodedad Estatal of Spain.

All that Jazz and More
Michel Camilo, a jazz pianist born
in the Dominican Republic, is re
ceiving rave reviews for his latest
album, On the Other Hand (Epic
Records). Trained at the National
Conservatory of the Dominican
Republic and later at the Juilliard
and Manes schools of music, Ca
milo was first noticed while he was
playing in saxophonist Paquito
D’Rivera’s band in the early 1980s.
Perhaps better known in Europe
than in the US, Camilo blends
Caribbean rhythms into his con
temporary jazz compositions. The
musician’s buoyant sound is fast
becoming a trademark of the new
Latin jazz.

■

El Puma
From Caracas, popular singer Jose
Luis Rodriguez (“El Pum a”) has an
nounced a new campaign to pro
mote US tourism in Latin America.
Known as “Go South America,” the
campaign will feature El Puma him
self as the program ’s spokesman.

Strange Bedfellows?
One of the hottest applied re
search projects in Latin America
has recently been completed in
Bogota, Colombia. Titled “Bogota
Needs Red Light Districts,” the
$150,000-study found there are

14,211 female prostitutes and 1,087
brothels in a 900-square block area
of downtown Bogota. A truly inter
disciplinary team—sociologists,
psychologists, and prostitutes—con
ducted the actual research. The
project was commissioned by the
city’s button-down chamber of
commerce, whose president, Mario
Suarez Melo, told one US reporter
(The Miami Herald, July 8, 1991)
that “Bogota is an immense red
light district” that needs to be
regulated.

On the Move
Robert Kurz, formerly on the staff
of Congressmen Michael Barnes
and Richard Gephardt, has been
appointed to the Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security
of the Committee on Government
Operations of the US House of
Representatives.
Ramon Daubon has been named
program representative for the
Ford Foundation in Santiago,
Chile. Daubon, who received his
Ph.D. in economics from the Uni
versity of Pittsburgh, worked with
the Inter-American Foundation as
representative for Chile and Ar
gentina in 1981-85. Prior to his ap
pointment, he was vice president
for the National Puerto Rican Co
alition in Washington.
Donna Hrinak, formerly deputy
chief of mission at the US Embassy
in Honduras and political coun
selor at the US embassy in Vene
zuela, has been named deputy
assistant secretary of state for the
Caribbean and Mexico.
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Corrupt to the Core
by Mario Diament

Against a backdrop of debt crisis, capitalflight, and growing poverty, the burden
of corruption weighs heavily upon the lives of Latin Americans

he downfall of Antonio
Erman Gonzalez in Janu
ary 1991—Argentina’s
third minister of the econ
omy since Carlos Menem
assumed the presidency a
year and a half before—was caused
by more than one circumstance.
Undoubtedly, however, the main
cause was corruption. Precipitating
Erman Gonzalez’s resignation was
the disclosure of US Ambassador
Terence Todm an’s letter to him on
December 10,1990, complaining
that the US-based Swift-Armour
company was being pressured by
Argentine government officials for
payoffs to expedite imports of nec
essary machinery. The person who
offered to be the intermediary for
that transaction was President
M enem’s brother-in-law and advi
sor, Emir Yoma.
Menem’s immediate reaction to
Todm an’s letter was to accuse the
executives of Swift-Armour—and indirecdy Ambassador Todman—of
orchestrating a campaign to dis
credit Argentina. When the US De
partm ent of State confirmed the
letter’s contents, Menem replied
that “the State Departm ent is more
preoccupied with what is happen
ing in Argentina than with what is

T

Mario Diament, an Argentine play
wright and journalist, is a columnist
with El Nuevo Herald in Miami.
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happening in the US, where cor
ruption cases are really alarming.”
Menem was correct in his assess
m ent of the magnitude of corrup
tion in the US. He was wrong,
though, in comparing it with cor
ruption in Argentina and, by ex
tension, with corruption in Latin
America. In the case of the US, cor
ruption exists within the system;
whereas in the case of Argentina
and Latin America, corruption is
the system.

In the case of the US,
corruption exists
zwihin the system.
In the case of Latin
America, corruption is
the system.

The distinction is not merely
semantic. It refers to the more fun
damental issue of the differences
that exist between the work ethic
and the mentality of Latin Amer
icans and North Americans. Some

recent cases of corruption in the
US, such as the savings-and-loan sit
uation, involve billions of dollars
with long-lasting and disastrous
consequences. Five prestigious US
senators, including a former presi
dential candidate, have been inves
tigated because of their ties with at
least one delinquent savings-andloan, and no less than President
George Bush’s son, Neil, has been
indicted because of his role in an
other.
This, however, is a case of cor
ruption within the system. As despi
cable as the case is, the system’s
foundations remain intact, thus
enabling it to purge itself. Even
though corrupt government offi
cials, police officers, and judges
exist, their presence constitutes an
exception and not the rule. More
over, the US system displays not
only the strict separation of pow
ers, but also a widespread moral
conviction regarding duty, responsi
bility, and obedience to law and
order. This separation of powers
and moral conviction ensure that
the US system can outlive and tran
scend its own perversions.
On the other hand, corruption
in Latin America is not merely a so
cial deviation, it is a way of life.
Abuse of power is so naturally in
corporated into society that to mod
ify it would require major surgery
on a national level. In Latin Amer
ica, then, the system is unable to

u

purge itself from its perversions be
cause they are precisely the founda
tion upon which it is built.
Corruption is not just an Argen
tine phenom enon. In Venezuela
they call it tajadcr, in Mexico, mordida\ in Peru, pagos; and in Argen
tina, coima. Each country coins
corruption differently, but the
principle is everywhere the same.
In Venezuela, for example, the situ
ation has gone so far that the first
volume of a Diccionario de la corrupcion, 1959-1979'was, recently pub
lished in Caracas. The volume
presents 60 leading cases of govern
m ent corruption in alphabetical
order. (Volume two will be pub
lished shortly.) And in Mexico,
where an estimated 80% of all busi
nesses and individuals are tax evad
ers, only two cases of tax evasion
were prosecuted by federal authori
ties between 1921 and 1988.
In Latin America, the individual
and the law are so blatantly es
tranged from one another that judi
cial pronouncem ents are looked
upon as acts of whim or conven
ience rather than expressions of
justice. If Latin Americans are quiz
zical about the law, it is because
their daily life is a necessary con
catenation of violations.
The primary reason for this con
dition is not the widely held belief
that Latin Americans are by nature
anarchic. It is, rather, the abusive
and wanton m anner in which those
in power have historically applied
the law: as an instrum ent for exer
cising their power rather than for
carrying out justice. It is thus no
surprise that the maxim, “hecha la
ley, hecha la trampa” (“where there is
a law, there is a trap”) seems to
have taken hold as the first amend
m ent of Latin America’s unspoken
constitution.
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Latin Americans have an onto
logical sense that the shortest dis
tance between two points is not
necessarily a straight line. In order
to accomplish any sort of transac
tion, the first step is to find a
friend, then a well-positioned per
son who takes bribes. Only then
can the transaction relevantly pro
ceed. The bribe, therefore, is the
price of participating in a system
where all negotiations are con
trolled by the powerful.

Latin Americans have
an ontological seme
that the shortest
distance between
two points is not
necessarily a straight
line. In order to
accomplish any sort of
transaction, thefirst
step is tofind a friend,
then a well-positioned
person who takes
bribes.

Latin Americans are so im
mersed in corruption—large and
small, official and personal—that
they have become desensitized to
its numerous manifestations. The
police officers who rob or the
judges who take bribes are no

S

longer outcasts of the system: they
are the system. Latin Americans
have become so convinced that
these day-to-day immoralities are in
dispensable for survival in the ju n 
gle that they fail to see their own
role in sustaining it.

The Maradona Affair
The case of international soccer
star Diego Maradona exemplifies
the dangers and perfidies natural
to such a jungle. It illustrates the
subtle ways in which an apparently
insignificant episode may be used
to cover up a corruption scandal
implicating top government offi
cials and members of a president’s
immediate family.
The life of Diego Armando
M aradona is the classic tale of the
rise and fall of a pop culture hero.
The oldest of an illiterate peon’s
seven children, Maradona parlayed
his breathtaking skills on the soc
cer field into an escape from the
wretched poverty of metropolitan
Buenos Aires. As a mere 16-yearold, ElPibe de Oro (“the Golden
Boy”) galvanized the public’s emo
tion during Argentina’s victory
over Hungary. Later he rocketed to
fortune, signing with Barcelona for
a world-record $10 million. In one
play during the 1986 World Cup he
danced around six British defend
ers, scoring a goal for the text
books. A player without peer, he
then led Naples to three consecu
tive championships.
This is the Maradona who daz
zled the world. The Maradona who
chartered a plane to je t his friends
from Rome to Buenos Aires for his
million-dollar wedding. Whose
charisma led President Menem to
name him sports ambassador of
Argentina.
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Then came the fall. First there
were discipline problems in the Na
ples team and rumors of a dissolute
life. Then there was a confronta
tion with Joao Havelange, presi
dent of the International Soccer
Federation. In March 1991 the Ital
ian Soccer Federation announced
the suspension of Maradona for 15
months after tests indicated recent
drug use. Finally, on April 26, Mara
dona was arrested while using co
caine with two childhood friends in
a ramshackle Buenos Aires apart
ment.
The media shifted from the glo
rious image of Maradona’s out
stretched arms accepting a
championship trophy to the trag
edy and disgrace of the hero’s drugdilated pupils. The international
press labeled Maradona the “fallen
angel.” Yet something seems amiss
in this story—a curious temporal
progression, a bothersome chain of
events that leads one to look be
yond the personal tragedy of
Maradona to the wider political
context of Argentina in crisis. For
instance, was it by chance that the
police raided the apartm ent where
Maradona happened to be using
cocaine?
According to police sources,
suspicion of narcotics trafficking
had led the police to stake out the
apartment for a week. Some initial
versions indicate Maradona was
apprehended there by coinci
dence. Yet later versions indicate
that the Superintmdmcia deDrogas
Peligrosas de la Policia Federal had
been tracking Maradona for sev
eral days. A story in the Buenos
Aires daily Clarin claims that agents
of the US Drug Enforcement Ad
ministration participated in the
operation.
Why would the Argentine po
lice—overwhelmed as they have
been by a crime wave that op
presses Buenos Aires, as well as by
many major cases of corruption in
volving entrepreneurs, politicians,
television stars, and government
bureaucrats—devote precious time
and resources to tracking and ar
resting a national hero for the rela
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tively m inor crime of personal drug
use? After all, Maradona did not ap
pear to have been involved in drug
trafficking. His behavior, while car
rying stiff punishm ent Under Ar
gentine law, was no threat to
society; the primary victim of his
behavior was Maradona himself.
Anyone reasonably familiar with Ar
gentina knows that the Maradona
drug bust was highly unusual, that

Something seems
amiss in the
Maradona story, a
bothersome chain of
events that leads one
to look beyond the
personal tragedy of
Maradona to the
wider political context
ofArgentina in crisis.

the striking violation of various
unwritten codes raises more ques
tions than it answers. For instance,
it is customary that in a typical po
lice case involving a celebrity, deci
sions are transferred to higher
levels of authority, and can even be
handled by the president himself.
This means that, if the police had
encountered Maradona unexpect
edly, they would have done every
thing in their power to remove him
from the scene without calling at
tention to his presence.
What happened, however, was
just the opposite: the police de
tained Maradona after calling the
press. Clearly they sought the wid

est publicity possible. Why? Who
stood to gain from a publicity coup
of this magnitude? Is it just coinci
dence that as Maradona was being
arrested for cocaine use, a major
scandal stemming from the alleged
participation of members of Presi
dent Menem’s own family in a nar
cotics trafficking operation came
under investigation by the Spanish
ministry of justice? New evidence
was appearing daily regarding
Argentina’s transformation into a
haven for the laundering of drug
money, and Washington was pres
suring the Menem government to
take a serious stand against narco
traffickers.
These problems seemed to
reach a peak during the very week
Maradona was taken into custody.
First, on April 19, the minister of
economy, Domingo Cavallo, had to
postpone a trip to the US and Eu
rope in the face of growing criti
cism over Argentina’s lack of
action against narcotraffickers. On
the 20th the influential newspaper
La Nation featured a headline pro
claiming that there was “Growing
Official Concern about Drug Traf
ficking,” and reported that the US
government was pressuring the
Menem administration to permit
Argentina’s armed forces to partici
pate in a campaign against narcotraffickers. On the 25th the Wall
Streetfoumal published an article
entitled “Drugs: The Argentine
Connection,” which provoked
great concern among Argentine
authorities in light of the fo u m a l s
international prestige. On the 26th
the police arrested Maradona.
Surely the “Golden Boy” was
taken by surprise. He was accus
tomed to hard play. But this was a
different kind of game, and he
didn’t know the rules. ■

Editor’s Note: Extracted from two col
umns (February 7 and May 2, 1991) of
El Nuevo Herald.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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The Israeli-Colombian Connection
by Allan Metz

he story of retired Israeli
military figures training
Colombian drug couriers
and coordinating weap
ons sales reads like a spy
thriller complete with
exotic locadons in the Caribbean
and Central America. Drug cartels,
weapons, killings, and a complex
trail of money traced through
Latin American and US bank ac
counts are all part of the sordid ac
tivities of retired colonel Yair Klein
and his Hod Hahanit (“Spearhead
Ltd.”) security company. A major
story in the Israeli media since ac
cusations were first raised in 1989,
revelations of Spearhead’s activities
in training Colombian drug para
military forces were followed by
charges that the colonel also coor
dinated arms sales between Israel
and the notorious Medellin drug
cartel. As a screen for these activ
ities, Klein used sales to the Carib
bean nation of Antigua.
These accusations were exam
ined in detail by Senator William
Roth’s (R-DE) Investigations Sub
committee based on testimony,
bank records, and other docu
mentation. The subcommittee
concluded that the Klein case is a
classic illustration of the worldwide
arms trade and its criminal connec
tions.

T

Transnational Web
The subcommittee investigation
provided further clarification of
the secretive money trail and con-

Allan Metz is assistant professor and
assistant subject specialistfor Latin
America at the University Library of the
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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clusively dispelled Klein’s claims
that he had no involvement in
arms trading and that the Antiguan
government paid for them. The
Senate hearings disclosed that
Klein paid the Israeli Military Indus
tries (IMI), a branch of the foreign
ministry, for the arms via a com
plex series of financial transactions
whose source was the “Spearhead
Ltd.” account in a Panamanian

The nexus involves
drug cartels, weapons,
killings, and a
complex international
trail of money.

bank. Since the Panamanian gov
ernm ent did not cooperate with
the Senate investigation, the issue
of whether the money in Klein’s ac
count in Panama was deposited
there by Colombian drug figures is
still unresolved. Nonetheless, the
Senate report concluded, “in spite
of our lack of access to relevant for
eign bank records .. ., the money
for the Antiguan weapons ship
m ent probably came from the
same source where the weapons
eventually ended up—Rodriguez
Gacha of the Medellin cartel.”
Besides the Panamanian bank
account, another connection to
Panama was made in the Senate
report. On February 13,1989,
$100,000 was paid into the Bank
Hapoalim account of IMI’s Miami
representative—Brigadier General

Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel
Eduardo H errera Hassan, a Pana
manian leader who at that time was
involved in the movement to oust
then strongman General Manuel
Noriega. It is generally known that
a paramilitary school Klein and
Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen
resident in Antigua since 1983—
had intended to establish in Anti
gua was to have been involved in
training forces to overthrow
Noriega.
By early 1989 it had already
been established that Klein had
trained drug gangs in Colombia
and he eventually went to trial in Is
rael. According to Klein’s attorney
Yigal Shapira: “It’s not as if he com
mitted a m urder or anything . . . .
This is like a contractor who builds
without a license. We are talking
about a two to five-month sus
pended sentence.” At the sentenc
ing hearing on January 3, 1991,
however, the judge thought other
wise. Klein received a one-year
suspended sentence, three years
probation, and a fine of $75,000
from the Jerusalem Magistrates
Court for the export of military ex
pertise without proper licensing. In
her decision, Judge Miriam Bern
stein also noted the great harm
done by Klein to Israel’s reputation
and the conduct of its foreign rela
tions.
Colombian officials took a much
dimmer view of Klein’s activities.
They linked Klein and Spearhead
to the training of the cartel’s para
military to perform assassinations,
massacres, bombings, and other
acts of terrorism. They claim
Klein’s training contributed to
the assassination of Colombian
presidential candidate Luis Carlos
Galan on August 18, 1989, and the
bombing of a commercial airliner

in November 1989, which killed
117 people. General Miguel Maza
Marquez, director of the Departamento Administrative de Seguridad (a
Colombian equivalent to the FBI),
charged in a February 1990 press
conference that Klein was “the per
son who has done the most dam
age to Colombia . . . (and) who
trained these people in the making
of bombs and is responsible for
this aggression.” Almost a year
later, Colombian foreign minister
Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa
protested Klein’s lenient sentence:
“We are seeing how the judicial sys
tems of other countries are quite
tolerant of actions which flagrantly

Corruption in Colombia
A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the
costs of corruption committed by public employees was ten times
greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.
The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the
problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about i t The most re
cent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes
were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed
by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing
rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with,
therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better.
The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that cov
erage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than cover
age on terrorism.
During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was ex
posed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregulari
ties committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney’s
office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials
for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned
507 members o f the armed forces. The reality is that our court system,
our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies
cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between
1988 and 1990 the Administration de Impuestos Nacionales fired 102 and
suspended another 151 employees. In the Institute de Seguras Sociales the
num ber of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first
two months of 1991. The nation’s attorney general, which is normally
capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently han
dling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogota, 2,000
employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative
crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29
parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public
municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72
members of the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92
popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the Direction General de
Aduanas are being investigated by the special investigations unit of the
attorney general’s office.
Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become
accustomed. There is even talk now of an entrenched bureaucraticadministrative “cartel.” Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive
can no longer be deferred. Only a month ago [February 1991], ex
president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in Nueva Frontera
entitled “The Thieves,” lambasted the multiple acts o f theft and de
linquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to
the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsifica
tion of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappear
ance of ownership certificates from the Caja de Vivienda Militar, the
stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the Banco Popular o f Santa
Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the Banco Central
Continued on page 27
Editor’s Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogota),
March 12, 1991.
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he story of retired Israeli
military figures training
Colombian drug couriers
and coordinating weap
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thriller complete with
exotic locations in the Caribbean
and Central America. Drug cartels,
weapons, killings, and a complex
trail of money traced through
Latin American and US bank ac
counts are all part of the sordid ac
tivities of retired colonel Yair Klein
and his Hod Hahanit (“Spearhead
Ltd.”) security company. A major
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revelations of Spearhead’s activities
in training Colombian drug para
military forces were followed by
charges that the colonel also coor
dinated arms sales between Israel
and the notorious Medellin drug
cartel. As a screen for these activ
ities, Klein used sales to the Carib
bean nation of Antigua.
These accusations were exam
ined in detail by Senator William
Roth’s (R-DE) Investigations Sub
committee based on testimony,
bank records, and other docu
mentation. The subcommittee
concluded that the Klein case is a
classic illustration of the worldwide
arms trade and its criminal connec
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clusively dispelled Klein’s claims
that he had no involvement in
arms trading and that the Antiguan
government paid for them. The
Senate hearings disclosed that
Klein paid the Israeli Military Indus
tries (IMI), a branch of the foreign
ministry, for the arms via a com
plex series of financial transactions
whose source was the “Spearhead
Ltd.” account in a Panamanian
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drug cartels, weapons,
killings, and a
complex international
trail of money.

bank. Since the Panamanian gov
ernm ent did not cooperate with
the Senate investigation, the issue
of whether the money in Klein’s ac
count in Panama was deposited
there by Colombian drug figures is
still unresolved. Nonetheless, the
Senate report concluded, “in spite
of our lack of access to relevant for
eign bank records . . . , the money
for the Antiguan weapons ship
m ent probably came from the
same source where the weapons
eventually ended up—Rodriguez
Gacha of the Medellin cartel.”
Besides the Panamanian bank
account, another connection to
Panama was made in the Senate
report. On February 13,1989,
$100,000 was paid into the Bank
Hapoalim account of IMI’s Miami
representative—Brigadier General

Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel
Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a Pana
manian leader who at that time was
involved in the movement to oust
then strongman General Manuel
Noriega. It is generally known that
a paramilitary school Klein and
Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen
resident in Antigua since 1983—

in November 1989, which killed
117 people. General Miguel Maza
Marquez, director of the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (a
Colombian equivalent to the FBI),
charged in a February 1990 press
conference that Klein was “the per
son who has done the most dam
age to Colombia .. . (and) who
trained these people in the making
of bombs and is responsible for
this aggression.” Almost a year
later, Colombian foreign minister
Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa
protested Klein’s lenient sentence:
“We are seeing how the judicial sys
tems of other countries are quite
tolerant of actions which flagrantly
violate international law and even
the laws in those countries . . . . In
any case, it is once again disap
pointing to see how justice oper
ates in the rest of the world.”
Even prior to this sentencing
hearing in early 1991, however,
most observers believed the Klein
trial had come too late, and proved
insufficient to soothe Colombia’s
intense anger at Israel’s indirect
role in narcoparamilitary outrages.
For example, on June 9,1989, then
Colombian president Virgilio
Barco Vargas made paramilitary
training (which is what Klein had
been involved in) a criminal of
fense punishable by prison terms
of up to 20 years. Another blow to
Israeli-Colombian relations was
NBC news broadcast on August 22,
1989, of a Spearhead promotional
videotape showing Klein training
Colombian drug militias. The
video was then repeated on the
other major networks, creating a
linkage in the public mind be
tween Israel and the drug cartels.
The publicity surrounding the
broadcast thus proved to be a great
embarrassment for Israel—a coun
try that takes pride in portraying
itself as a leader in the struggle
against terrorism.
As for Klein, he was only too
willing to cast aspersions on the
Colombian government. On Au
gust 25,1989, he declared: “I esti
mate that there is no organization
in Colombia that is not linked to

Corruption in Colombia
A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the
costs o f corruption committed by public employees was ten times
greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.
The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the
problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about i t The most re
cent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes
were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed
by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing
rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with,
therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better.
The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that cov
erage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than cover
age on terrorism.
During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was ex
posed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregulari
ties committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney’s
office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials
for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned
507 members of the arm ed forces. The reality is that our court system,
our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies
cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between
1988 and 1990 the Administration de Impuestos Nationales fired 102 and
suspended another 151 employees. In the Instituto de Seguros Sociaks the
num ber of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first
two m onths of 1991. The nation’s attorney general, which is normally
capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently han
dling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogota, 2,000
employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative
crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29
parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public
municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72
members o f the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92
popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the Direction General de
Aduanasare being investigated by the special investigations unit of the
attorney general’s office.
Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become
accustomed. There is even talk now o f an entrenched bureaucraticadministrative “cartel.” Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive
can no longer be deferred. Only a m onth ago [February 1991], ex
president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in Nueva Frontera
entitled “The Thieves,” lambasted the multiple acts of theft and de
linquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to
the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsifica
tion of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappear
ance of ownership certificates from the Caja de Vivienda Militar, the
stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the Banco Popular of Santa
Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the Banco Central
Continued on page 27
Editor’s Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogota),
March 12, 1991.
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drugs, from the government down
wards.”
In a later development, on
March 25,1991, the Jerusalem
District Court rejected a libel suit
filed by Klein against Ron BenYishai, a reporter for the Tel Aviv
newspaper Yediot Aharonot. BenYishai reported that Klein and his
colleagues, four of whom are co
plaintiffs, had been “security in
structors” for the Medellin cartel.
The judge determined that BenYishai had written in good faith
and that his article was in the pub
lic interest. She also ruled favorably
in the reporter’s countersuit by
awarding him a small am ount in
damages.
The US Senate subcommittee
provided additional facts on the Is
raeli connection. It noted that
Klein and his associates worked
with paramilitary groups led by
Rodriguez Gacha and the Medellin
cartel. They described Israeli mer
cenary activities in Colombia as “a
sordid tale of greed and intrigue”
and related how Klein’s firm gave
three training courses that in
cluded basic infantry and weaponry
instruction, defensive and body
guard techniques, and explosives
detection. The Senate report fur
ther stated that: “Israeli embassy
personnel knew Yair Klein was oper
ating in Colombia, but no action
was taken against him until after re
ports of his activities surfaced in
the media . . . . Hopefully, Klein’s
subsequent criminal prosecution
and conviction under Israeli law in
dicate that the Israeli government
intends to monitor such activities
more closely in the future.”
This conclusion was also
reached in the final report of the
one-man Commission of Inquiry
for Antigua and Barbuda. The au
thor, British Queen Counsel, Louis
Blom-Cooper, described the affair
as a “wicked enterprise.” While he
did not believe the Israeli govern
m ent had any knowledge the weap
ons were destined for Colombia,
he did find that Israel had been
negligent in its failure to exercise
control over the IMI. The report
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listed a num ber of aspects of the
transaction for the sale and pur
chase of the guns and ammunition
“. . . which showed a lack of care.”
Although the focus of his in
quiry was Antigua, Blom-Cooper
did make some comments and rec
ommendations regarding Israel.
He suggested further investigation
into and monitoring of Israeli
citizens’ actions abroad and also
the establishment of a UN registry
of end-user certificates. These pro
posals seem not only reasonable
but necessary. There is a grey area
involving the activities of these re
tired military officials as private citi
zens and their activities on behalf
of government or industry. Many
are employed in Israel’s profitable
arms export sector as dealers, train
ers, and technical advisors to a
num ber of Third World countries
that seek Israel’s technology and
expertise.
For example, one of the key fig
ures in the case, Brigadier General
Pinchas Shahar, who served as a
link between the IMI and Klein
and his Spearhead, is currently in
Israel. There he is employed by the
Elul arms company, owned by
Koor, the holding company of the
Israeli labor federation. The KleinSpearhead affair was not a total ab
erration; Klein and Shahar fit the
common profile of the activist
retired officer.

Have Guns, Will Travel
Klein describes himself as “an ex
pert in war against terrorists and an
expert in war against guerrillas . . . .
I am brave and a little adventur
ous.” With “ice-blue” eyes and
closely cut hair, Klein fits the
image of an Israeli military hero.
He was born on a kibbutz, where
many war heroes came from. Im
mediately following completion of
technical school, Klein joined Com
pany 890, the country’s first elite
paratroop unit. He led helicopter
troops and “secret ‘antiterrorist’ op
erations.” He fought in the 1967
Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, and following retire

m ent in 1979 he started a restau
rant and operated a service station.
These pursuits proved to be too
tame for Klein’s restless spirit. He
observed that “Some people like to
knit. I like to help people defend
themselves. I go in where the gov
ernm ent can’t go, where it can’t
allow its name to be used.” Klein’s
Spearhead company sold clothes
and hardware in the early 1980s to
Beirut-based Christian Falangist
militias and to the South Lebanon
Army, a militia with ties to Israel
located along the border between
Israel and Lebanon. He later ex
tended his operations to Latin
America, including Guatemala
and Colombia.
One can understand, therefore,
the critical and timely nature of
Blom-Cooper’s point concerning
the role of former Israeli military
figures who are involved in selling
weapons and military expertise to
the highest bidder. This issue con
stitutes a national debate in Israel.
In addition it raises questions
about the Defense Ministry’s re
sponsibility to control the export of
Israeli weaponry and military exper
tise, and how former Israeli mili
tary personnel like Klein became
involved in such illegal activities. Is
rael has had a long-standing inter
est in selling its surplus military
hardware to the Third World.
Israel’s two major parties, Likud
and Labor, have long opposed the
passage of laws that would allow
the Knesset to control the sale of
military exports and prohibit sales
to certain nations. Israeli middle
men such as Klein have been suc
cessful in manipulating Israel’s
desire to maximize military ex
ports—the main reason for Israel’s
indiscriminate weapons sales pol
icy—to suit their own enterprises.
The government claims its arms
trade is essential to support the
country’s strategic internal needs
for manufacturing and developing
arms. In the mid-1980s the arms
trade accounted for some 25% of
Israel’s industrial exports.
Latin America became a signif
icant Israeli market for war mate-

riel when the US terminated or re
duced military sales to several gov
ernm ents accused of committing
hum an rights violations. Official Is
raeli military sales to the Colom
bian government am ount to
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Since 1986 the Israeli government
has m andated that firms providing
overseas military or security train
ing apply for a license from the
Defense Ministry for each project.
This action was taken after the Irancontra affair revealed that Israeli
arms traders were involved in Oli
ver North’s plan to sell weapons to
Iran in order to raise funds for the
contra war against the Sandinistas.
According to the Defense Ministry,
800 Israelis and Israeli companies
have received licenses to export
weapons and technology. Israeli se
curity officials admit, however, that
it is much harder to monitor the ex
port of ex-military m en’s expertise
than to control weapons exports.
For example, Israeli trainers have
been linked to government repres
sion of guerrillas in Guatemala and
to security protection for the for
m er Panamanian dictator General
Manuel Noriega. Israel also had
ties with Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio Somoza until his over
throw in 1979. This dubious record
prom pted the independent Israeli
newspaper Hadashot to wonder in
an editorial: “What are our boys
doing in Colombia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, El
Salvador, Costa Rica, and not just
those places?”

New Twist
But the Klein-Spearhead case
marks a departure from past ac
tivities. It is the first time Israelis
have been charged with training
narcotics armies. According to the
Tel Aviv daily Yediot Aharanot, Is
raeli involvement with the drug mi
litias is of great concern to Israeli
government officials: “This time
the issue is not aid to guerrilla
groups, rebels or even fascistic
government(s), as was customary
until now. Now it is Israeli merce-

Continuedfrom page 25
Hipotecario. ‘T h e national treasury,” he concluded, “has been a victim of
thieves who deserve to be punished. Thieves and what thieves . . . never
before has so much been stolen. Crime but also official indifference.
Poor country!”
Experts identify the costs of corruption under four broad con
sequences. First, corruption destroys the efficiency of the state by
squandering its resources and debilitating its actions against misman
agement. Such corruption can even lead to threats to the public health:
for instance, shoddy construction, use of dated or tainted medicines, or
the redirection of basic food stuffs from children’s hostels to other
uses—all known to have occurred recently in Colombia.
Second, corruption engenders an absurd distortion in the distribu
tion of income by making the rich richer and the poor poorer. The
poor get poorer, for instance, when public projects for the more disad
vantaged parts of the population are either not completed or are com
pleted at substandard levels because of corruption.
Third, the incentives of corruption are contrary to the development
of the society: they spawn the insidious idea that it is easier to get rich
by working for the state than by starting a private and productive busi
ness. This idea militates against the creation of new jobs. Half of the
administrative positions of a certain rank are occupied by people nomi
nated by political bosses, not by career bureaucrats.
Fourth, corruption incurs serious political costs: immorality, cyni
cism, institutional instability, and the legitimization of armed rebellion
against the state. Colombia’s most serious problem is the political sys
tem ’s lack of legitimacy among the masses. This problem stems from
the widespread corruption, and it is illusory to think that constitutional
reform will solve it.
How can we confront a problem of such magnitude? The first step
requires the political will to put an end to the scourge, or at least to re
duce it to manageable proportions. The will was shown when the presi
dency created the Consejeria de Moralizadon Administrative., even though
there already are voices opposing it. An analogous system was used with
complete success in Hong Kong, formerly one of the most corrupt
spots on earth. There a commission of five people of impeccable cre
dentials, invested with full powers to penetrate banking secrecy, tap
telephones, intercept the mails, and trail suspects was successful. In
Colombia the Consejeria ought to be supported by the most m odem in
vestigatory technology, among these prosecutors with full powers, ac
countants, computer-assisted audits, electronic surveillance of financial
transfers, and communications o f various types.
But the crusade against corruption goes even further: the comptrol
ler general has contracted FedesarroUo to do the first study ever on the
state of corruption in Colombia. To be completed by the end of 1991, it
represents an attempt to diminish the trend of social decomposition.
Given the opening and internationalizing of Colombia’s economy,
corruption is a graver obstacle than is the inefficiency of the ports or
the absence of railroads. In the final analysis, the discrediting of the gov
erning classes is the most serious consequence of the high level of de
moralization. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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naries who served in elite units and
have agreed to serve the drug car
tels for hundreds of thousands of
dollars per person.” Motti Amichai,
an Israeli foreign ministry spokes
man, declared that Klein’s actions
violated Israeli law and ran counter
to Israeli policy, which is “strongly
committed to the war on drugs.”
Israel has tough antidrug laws,
and drugs are a cultural taboo. It
is ironic, then, that allegations of
Israeli involvement with drug traf
fickers coincide with Israel’s con
siderable increase in drug abuse.
Colombian intelligence officials,
however, have expressed skepti
cism over the Israeli government’s
denials of knowledge about Klein’s
activities. According to an anony
mous senior official: “The Israeli
government would have to be very

foolish or very naive not to have
known what was going on . . . . And
the Israelis are neither. But the
truth is, as this shows, they will sell
anything to anyone if the price is
right.”
Meanwhile, in Israel, the KleinSpearhead incident received a
mixed response among public of
ficials. To Justice Minister Dan
Meridor it represented a “serious
injury to Israel’s image, to the
image of the [Israel Defense
Forces]. It is important that it re
mains positive, of a patriotic army
conducting a righteous war in a
moral way.” Foreign Minister
Moshe Arens demonstrated similar
indignation when he promised the
government would “do everything
in our power to enforce the law
and prevent all aid by Israelis to
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the drug cartel.” According to Meir
Amit, form er director of Mossad,
Israel’s equivalent to the CIA: ‘T he
greatest damage is that, rather
than being known as producers in
agriculture, in genetics, in medi
cine, our trademark is now in the
security business, whether it be
weapons or support systems.”
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, on
the other hand, was not as categori
cal: “It’s unpleasant to hear about
Israelis involved in such ugly busi
ness, but there are Israelis all over
the world doing things the state
cannot be held responsible for.”
He was also quoted as saying: “I
don’t know if all the information,
allegations, incriminations are
true. I know our people. I know
our officers. I cannot believe that
they have been involved in such
crimes . . . . ”
Ariel Sharon, who tends toward
military solutions to most of Israel’s
problems, was even more equivo
cal. “Klein and his associates,” he
stated, “have already been judged.
It’s simply unbelievable. With our
own hands we are making Israel re
sponsible for the subject of drugs
in Colombia.” In reaction to
Sharon’s defense of Klein, Yossi
Sarid, a leftist Knesset member of
the Citizens’ Rights Party and a
msyor figure in the Israeli peace
movement, was adamant: “A bluff
er like Klein needs a lot of defend
ing because his version of events
concerning banana growers is itself
a banana version—here and there
soft, here and there rotten.”
Klein’s defense can be seen as
disingenuous or cynical and per
haps even both. Even the benefit of
hindsight, he says, may not have
been sufficient to guarantee that
his training was not utilized for
criminal purposes. And if some
thing did go awry, he protests it
was because he was “an innocent
abroad.” He asks rhetorically: “Do
you know any genuine fighters who
are not naive? Yes, there was naive
te in this.” And then, the ultimate
attempt at personal vindication:
“.. . it’s also naive to think there is
justice in the world.” ■
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Calypso Politics
by Daisann McLane

The rhythms of music and politics are tightly synchronized in Caribbean societies
such as Trinidad, as reflected in the calypso diplomacy ofAbu Bakr’sfailed coup
and its aftermath
hen the rebel leader
Yasin Abu Bakr and
his followers cap
tured Trinidad and
Tobago’s House of
Parliament and
broadcasting studios in an at
tem pted coup in July 1990, one
of the first things they did—after
taking the prime minister and his
cabinet hostage—was turn Trini
dad’s television station into calypso
MTV. Until the authorities jam m ed
their broadcasts, the rebel group
Jam aat al Muslimeen ran continu
ous videos of politically aware ca
lypso singers like David Rudder,
Watchman, and Cro Cro in be
tween Abu Bakr’s running com
mentary. Abu Bakr’s stint as
revolutionary video host demon
strated what Trinidadians have
long known: calypso (and soca, the
m odern multitrack studio version
of this traditional music) is as im
portant as politics in this lively,
noisy, multiethnic Caribbean de
mocracy.

W

Calypso Messages
Since Trinidad’s independence
from Britain in 1962, the messages
of calypso have influenced the
speeches of prime ministers and
the decisions of judges, and calypso

Daisann McLane, aformer calypso
singer, is a free-lance writer on Latin
American and Caribbean music.
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records have helped parties win—
and lose—elections. In using the
music as a political tool, Abu Bakr
was following a time-tested Trini
dad formula (in fact, one of his
advisers was a form er calypso pro
moter) .
Despite his “calypso diplomacy,”
Abu Bakr’s revolution failed to at
tract popular support, and the at
tem pted coup resulted in dozens of
deaths, a wave of looting that de

stroyed several blocks of the capi
tal, and five months of martial law.
Abu Bakr, who is now in prison,
may have failed in this purpose,
but he helped revitalize the na
tion’s music. This skipping, synco
pated Caribbean pop has made
some inroads in the US market,
but in past years it has sounded as
spent as the petrodollars that used
to overflow from Trinidad’s trea
sury.
Every year calypsonians write
and record new songs timed to Car
nival season. But because of the
coup, releases in 1990-91 have had
an added resonance: they try to
make sense of it all by examining
the economic and social issues that
provoked the unrest. The songs of
Carnival 1991 were equal parts psy
chic housecleaning, national ca
tharsis, and political analysis.
Indeed, for the non-Trinidadian,
recent releases by Cro Cro, Watch
man, Superblue, Black Stalin, and
David Rudder provide a lively semi
nar on Caribbean history and cur
rent events—with a beat.
The biting antigovernment com
mentary of Cro Cro and Watchman
often seems crude: both calypsoni
ans refer in their songs to a re
ported incident during the July
1990 siege in which the rebels al
legedly shoved a female minister’s
underpants down the prime min
ister’s throat. But the rough lan
guage and barbed cynicism of both
singers reflect post-coup public sen
timent—a profound anger over

economic mismanagement and al
leged corruption in the govern
m ent of Prime Minister Arthur N.
R. (Robbie) Robinson. There is
also a certain sympathy for Abu
Bakr’s intentions, if not for his
methods.
Cro Cro, one of the best lyricists
of Trinidad’s younger generation,
presents an elegant, well-tooled ar
gum ent that captures street-level
opinion about Abu Bakr. His “Say a
Prayer for Abu Bakr,” delivered in
a low-key tenor spiked with irony
and softened with wit, demon
strates that the calypso form is one
of the last repositories of Englishlanguage rhetoric in the 20th cen
tury: “In this democratic society/The
coup was wrong without a doubt/If all
o’you was so against Robbie/Why de
hell didn’t you vote him out?/But then
again if you wait til election/Man
might have had to start eating man/So
don’t blame Abu Bakr, don’t fuss/Bakr
did it for all of us.”
The title of W atchman’s top
song of the 1991 Carnival season,
“Attack with Full Force,” is lifted
from a statement issued by Robin
son to the Trinidad military during
his imprisonment by the rebels.
But Watchman, a student leader at
the University of the West Indies,
turns the tables and takes the
prime minister’s order as a man
date to attack the Robinson admin
istration. Watchman, still in his 20s,
is the brashest and most critical
voice in calypso today. (It was his
video that Abu Bakr played on na
tional TV in the early hours of the
coup attempt.) And Watchman
knows how to use symbolism to
maximum effect: he performed
“Attack” wearing the camouflage
fatigues of the army special forces
team that captured the rebels.
In Trinidad dissent in music is
business as usual. During the sixweek Carnival period, calypsonians
speak the unspeakable—and politi
cians put up with it, perhaps be
cause this ritual serves to diffuse
discontent that might otherwise
find more turbulent channels. As
the calypsonian David Rudder ex
plains: “Calypso helps keep our so

ciety on an even keel. The songs be
come our violent acts. We kill each
other with song.”
Nevertheless, when it comes
time for the state-sponsored Ca
lypso Monarch competition, an
annual event to select the best ca
lypso composition, moderation
rules. For the February 10,1991,
contest, which was nationally tele
vised, Cro Cro censored his line
about the infamous panties. And
when the ballots were tallied, he
and Watchman (who kept the un
derwear in) had been defeated by
the calypso veteran Black Stalin,
whose coup composition, “Look on
the Bright Side,” was a masterpiece
of ambiguity. The song never ex
plains whether the “bright side” is a
return to normalcy or the hopedfor electoral defeat of Robinson.

Calypso helps keep
our society on an even
keel. The songs become
our violent acts. We
kill each other xvith
song.
Stalin, a Rastafarian in his early
50s with waist-length dreadlocks
and a gleeful, insinuating rasp, usu
ally pitches his commentary to the
left of center; a three-time Calypso
Monarch, his is the voice of the
Trinidadian working class. But this
year, Stalin threw a curve. His
other song of the season, “Black
Man Feel to Party,” bounced and
“wined”—Trinidad slang for hip ro
tation—its way up the dance charts
to become one of the season’s topthree party tunes. Trinidad audi
ences delighted at the sight of the
politically conscious Stalin ham
ming it up on stage as a rheumatic,
middle-aged husband, urging his
wife to come out and dance “like
we used to do before the children
come.”

Less “Jam and Wine”
“Feel to Party,” with its bubbly, scatsung groove, is an example of the
most important, and lasting, effect
the coup has had on calypso. Over
the last four years, the party rec
ords produced by Trinidad’s calyp
so stars had come under increased
fire for their musical predictability
and repetitious “jam and wine”
topics. But, after the traumatic
experience of the coup attempt,
Trinidadians seem to have lost pa
tience with empty lyrics.
All the top dance-hall soca rec
ords of 1991, even the ones not
specifically political, have had a
clever twist, a story, or a slangy
series of puns to tickle the public
imagination. In Bally’s “Calypso
Coup,” “back back,” a hip motion,
becomes “back Bakr.” In David
Rudder’s love song, “Nuff Re
spect,” the woman calls the shots—
highly unusual in the macho
culture.
As is always the case when major
events shake Trinidad, there was
one perfect song: Superblue’s “Get
Something and Wave.” A tour de
force of sociopolitical pop, “Wave”
uses the off-center drum beat of
Trinidad’s African-derived Spiri
tual Baptists and taps into religious
symbols.
Superblue’s joyful exhortation
to wave something galvanized a
country in which flags are a key
elem ent in the rituals of three im
portant local religions: Shango,
Hindu, and Muslim. (Abu Bakr’s
coup occurred on Hosay, an Is
lamic holiday usually marked by a
parade with small flags.) The thou
sands of fluttering cloths that burst
out of nowhere every time “Wave”
was played at Carnival weren’t just
a fad—the flags represented an
affirmation of Trinidad’s multi
ethnic culture and determination
to bind the wounds of the coup.
Or, as Rudder explains: “Calypso is
an art form that laughs at pain.
That’s the way we deal with our
blues. We begin to heal ourselves
immediately, through our culture
and our music.” ■
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Merengue: From Race to Gender
by Deborah Pacini Hernandez

nergetic and brassy, the
many varieties of merengue
are the Dominican Repub
lic’s most popular dance
music. Yet merengue's driv
ing rhythm blasts far be
yond the dance floor. Imbedded in
the music’s long and rich history
are the evolving tensions and reso
lutions of race, class, and culture in
the making of Dominican national
identity.
Merengue dates from the years
1822-44, when Dominicans strug
gled to end Haiti’s occupation of
their territory. The story goes that
a song ridiculing a wounded flagbearer who deserted the battlefield
emerged at a spontaneous victory
celebration, and that merengue's par
ticular dance step—in which one
foot drags behind the other—was
the result of revelers mimicking
the injured coward’s limping gait.
While colorful and engaging,
this account likely reflects the de
sire to portray the Haitian occupi
ers in unfavorable light, as well as
Dominican sentiment that denies
Haitian musical influence. Indeed,
Dominicans have never quite for
given Haiti for having made the Do
minican Republic the only country
in Latin America to have been sub
jugated by blacks. Their denial of
African heritage was solidified
under the dictatorship of Rafael
Trujillo (1930-61), whose racist pol
icies included the 1937 massacre of

E
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bachata, ’’Popular Music (1990).
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thousands of persons of Haitian
descent and the prohibition of folk
traditions with clear African or
Haitian antecedents. By local stan
dards the Dominican population is
73% mulatto, 16% white, and 11%
black. Nevertheless, the negritude
movements that surfaced in Carib
bean countries such as Haiti, Cuba,
and Jamaica have been notably ab
sent in the Dominican Republic.

Merengue has evolved
as contested terrain
for debate about the
Dominican Republic’s
national identity,
from the issue of
African roots to the
empowerment of
women.

In contrast with the Dominican
interpretation, Haitian music his
torians claim that their country’s
meringue is the precursor of meren
gue. Others regard Cuba or Puerto
Rico as the music’s birthplace. In
any case, the Dominican Republic
is clearly the site where merengue
has taken strongest hold.
Merengue was originally rural
music that enlivened events of all
sorts, from weddings and saints’
day festivals to cockfights and Sun
day gatherings. In addition, meren

gue songs were vehicles of social
commentary for illiterate people.
Given merengue's roots in vernac
ular culture, it not surprisingly be
came a symbol of the Dominican
Republic’s national identity. Its ac
ceptance spread into the country’s
upper classes during the US occu
pation of the country in 1916-24.
In promoting this acceptance, com
posers transformed merengue from
rural folk to urban salon and dance
music.
The next phase of merengue’s evo
lution took place during the 31year Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo
used reward and threat to coopt
the music, turning it into a mouth
piece for his concentraton of pow
er. In so doing, he orchestrated the
refashioning of merengue into a sym
bol of his regime’s power and
modernity, gaining the music de
finitive entry into the ballrooms of
the urban elite. The political cost,
however, was tremendous. Not only
did Trujillo tolerate no merengue
lyric critical of his rule; his im
mense power forced any musician
of stature who remained in the
country to literally sing his praises.
Among the forgettable song titles
were “Veneremos a Trujillo” (“Let Us
Venerate Trujillo”), “Trujilloes
grande e inmortar (“Trujillo is Great
and Immortal”), and “Trujilloprotec
tor de choferes” (‘Trujillo the Protec
tor of Drivers”).
Remarkably, after Trujillo’s
death in 1961 merenguewas not dis
credited, but instead became a sym
bol of Dominican society’s new
openness and progress. Johnny
Ventura, one of the first and most
successful of the new breed of
merengueros, shed the ballroom orquesta trappings of the Trujillo era
in favor of a smaller, more ener
getic combo style. Influenced in part

by US rock-and-roll, Ventura’s
combo introduced glittery costumes,
fast-paced choreography, and
spicy, satirical lyrics. By the late
1970s merengue achieved a success
ful presence in the international
music scene.
Meanwhile, merengue became
contested terrain for debate within
the Dominican Republic about the
country’s national identity. This de
bate came to include intellectual
currents that sought to forge a new
socially and politically progressive
identity, one that would credit Do
minican musical traditions with
clear African roots. Recognition of
African contributions to Domini
can culture and music was not won
easily. In response to one declara
tion of merengue's African origins,
Luis Senior, a leading merengue
band leader, wrote an article vehe
mently stating that “This outland
ish statement is unpatriotic!”
By the early 1980s merengue dis
placed salsa as the preferred dance
music of Latin Americans through
out the hemisphere. In the eupho
ria, divisive discussion of merengue’s
African origins seems to have been
left behind. Taking its place is a
signal of profound change in Do
minican society: the stepping to
the forefront of women in merengue
ensembles, such as La Media Naranja and Las Chicas del Can, not
just as singers but as instrumental
ists as well. Trombones, trumpets,
bass, congas, and synthesizers—for
merly the exclusive domain of
men—are increasingly in the
hands of women. So too are the
lyrics, which are coming to reflect
female points of view. As Belkis
Concepcion with Las Chicas del Can
sings in “El Gran Poder” (“The
Great Power”): “Oyemebien, tratala
bien/Que a diferencia de ayer/Hoy
existe el gran poder/De la mujer/Hoy
ella tiene libertad/Para poder defen
der/Su igualdad, su dignidad/Y el
gran amor de la mujer’’ (“Listen to me,
treat her well/Unlike yesterday/Today
there’s the great power/Of woman/
Today she’s got thefreedom/To be able
to defend/Her equality, her dignity/And woman’s great love”). m
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Samba World
by Andrea Mantell Seidel

Samba
by Alma Guillermoprieto. New York:
Knopf, 1990. 244 pp. $19.95.
“

JMR

marmalade-thick river
of people swept past;
K
outlandish dancers in
feathers and capes, ballgowns and G-strings,
f l s ■ ■ hundreds of drummers;
thousands of leaping princes sing
ing at the top of their lungs. In the
ocean of feathers and banners,
faces emerged: brown, white, pink,
tan, olive” (p. 6).
So begins Alma Guillermoprieto’s introduction to the mes
merizing world of Carnival and
samba—song, story, music, and
dance—in Rio de Janeiro. Samba is
centered around the Mangueira
samba school. The school, one of
hundreds scattered throughout the
favelas—the ramshackle slums on
the hillsides of Rio—is composed
of black Brazilians who unite for
the single purpose of parading to
gether through the main streets of
Rio at Carnival time. After many
months of strenuous and costly
preparation, each of the favelas
sends up to 5,000 dancers and
musicians, elaborately costumed in
the school’s official colors, to com
pete in the Carnival parade.
As the narrative unfolds, Guiller
moprieto portrays the venerable
Andrea Mantell Seidel holds a joint
position as assistant professor in the
Department of Theater and Dance at
Florida International University and in
the New World School of the Arts Dance
Division, Miami. She recently directed
and performed in the Eleanor King Me
morial Dance Program at the Lincoln
Center Library ofPerforming Arts, in
New York City.
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and popular Mangueira samba
school as much more than a mere
gathering of individuals; it be
comes a m etaphor for joy, pride,
and hope amid the violence, drugs,
poverty, and racism that pervade
existence in the favelas. Poised at
the heart of community life, the
schools serve, in part, to reconnect
the blacks of the favela to their Afri
can “roots,” to the candomblegods
whose origin lies in West Africa’s
Yoruba religion, and to a buried
Brazilian past nearly obliterated by
the dom inant white government
and the Catholic Church.

Poised at the heart of
community life, the
samba schools
reconnect the blacks of
thefavela to their
African roots and
Brazilian past.

With sensitivity and passion,
Guillermoprieto traces the com
plex history and culture of samba
from its turn-of-the-century roots in
Brazilian slave culture to the extrav
agant, commercialized displays of
contemporary Carnival—which is
now a vital part of mainstream Bra
zilian society. The beat of samba,
felt in its pulsing 2/ 4 time and
in its sensuous, hypnotic dance
rhythms, defines the rhythms of
social life and organization in the

favelas. Story, song, and dance sam
ba serve as the primary repositories
of historical identity in an AfroAmerican culture that lacks its
own written history.
The beat of samba is also power
fully expressed in Guillermoprieto’s rhythmic, potent language.
Born in Mexico, trained as a
dancer, and a journalist by profes
sion, Guillermoprieto writes with a
journalist’s eye for detail and im
mediacy tem pered with a dancer’s
sense of rhythm and kinetic power.
Through her vivid portraits and
lush, poetic narratives, the intimate
fabric of community life is re
vealed; first the months, then the
weeks, the days, and at last, the ten
sions and passions of the final
hours of Carnival unfold.
“A beautiful black youth with a
blank face and a body like a snake
weaves through the early-morning
drinkers with a friend. The friend,
an ostrich-like bird with sparkling
midnight-blue plumage, emerges
from the back of the minute, fleshcolored bikini the youth is wearing
and rears it’s richly feathered neck
along the boy’s supple spine . . . .
The floats tower like magical king
doms in the glorious morning that
is breaking, and a mute, awed
crowd stands around them, still for
once, just staring” (p. 209).

Carnival Societies
At the time of Guillermoprieto’s
writing, the Mangueira samba
school had captured the grand Car
nival prize two years in a row. She
records the school’s quest for a
“triple crown” during the year she
lived in Rio and participated in the
Carnival preparations. The Man
gueira school prided itself, not in
the elaborateness of their costumes

as did the higher class white soci
ety, but in the sense of cultural
grounding, or “root,” it endeav
ored to keep alive. Dona Neuma,
one of the influential matriarchs of
the school’s directorate, proudly
proclaims that “it’s not our cos
tumes that win .. . the crowd goes
crazy for us because we have root
and we have spirit. And the soul of
that is the baianas.” The candomble
temples of Rio de Janeiro were orig
inally set up by baianas (“Aunts of
Bahia”) , freed women slaves who
brought the cult with them when
they emigrated from Bahia. To this
day, all samba schools have a con
tingent of “baianas” in honor of
these women.
With the dawn of the 20th
century, an emerging class of black
artisans, skilled laborers, and pro
fessionals aspired to transcend
their African roots. As a result, they
began to adopt the latest European
fashions and behaviors. Instead of
chanting and drumming, black Car
nival took on a new “civilized” air.
The advent of Brazilian radio in
1923 and its broadcasts of samba
music heralded the “Samba Era” in
mainstream white society, and the
black music and dance of Brazil ac
quired a national following.
The author recounts how the
schools represent “carnival socie
ties,” hierarchies of class and color
now institutionalized in the Carni
val parade. The most prestigious
are the stars of the parade, white
men and women, who ride high on
the grandest floats in glittering, bejeweled costumes. Below them are
the floats with nearly nude danc
ing women—whites, light-skinned
black women, or mulattos. The
poverty-stricken majority—darkskinned favelados, both male and fe
male—must parade on the road as

the cost of the floats are prohibi
tive to them.
In subsequent chapters, Gui
llermoprieto leads us through a
magical, paradoxical world: one of
decadent splendor and poignant
exuberance. Although this world is
observed and vividly recorded, she
fails to delve beneath the surface of

The advent of
Brazilian radio in the
1920s heralded the
“Samba Era”in
mainstream white
society, and black
music and dance
acquired a national
folloiving.

events and explore the nature and
meaning of these paradoxes in the
world that transcends the isolated
confines of the favela. Herein lies
the book’s greatest weakness. On
the one hand, as a dancer, I ad
mire her ability to capture the soul
of the samba with freshness and di
rectness, unencum bered by the
weight of analysis and interpreta
tion. On the other, as a dance eth
nologist, I was often frustrated by
her failure to penetrate to the
heart of its meaning. Ana, an at
tractive, but impoverished bamba, a
woman wise in the ways of the
samba world, advised Guillermo
prieto to “forget about the notetak-

ing” and “to stop trying to write
down what happens”: “If you don’t
give in to the spirit of carnival, if
you don’t let it overwhelm you,
you’ll never understand what it’s
like, so how will you be able to ex
plain it to others? If you have the
experience, you won’t forget a min
ute of it” (p. 195).
In this moment, we are con
fronted by the dilemma faced by all
those who seek to understand a cul
ture different from their own. Un
doubtedly, deep understanding
involves a process of “letting go”:
an immersion of the self in the rich
wholeness of the experience. Never
theless, samba and Carnival, like
other masquerades and festivals
worldwide, are complex cultural
and symbolic events. They demand
a degree of analysis, reflexivity, and
interpretation to understand and
communicate them effectively to
others.

Shock and Laughter
Although Samba is rich with histori
cal reference, its descriptive, nonanalytical style leaves too many
questions unanswered to make it
the definitive study that it could be.
For example, we learn that “only
women dance in the central space
while men dance along the edges
of the road and that the real
bambas dance in all-male groups”
(p. 18). We do not learn, however,
what these facts reveal about social
relations between men and wom
en. Moreover, we do not learn how
this event relates to similar occur
rences in other festivals and mas
querades throughout the world.
Sexual ambivalence, ubiquitous
throughout Carnival in the blatant
transvestism and in the pervasive
cross-gender dressing, is discussed
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but not explored as a critical issue:
“Like the devotees of Ishtar, the
sex-changing goddess of Babylon,
Dona Diva and her friends would
switch clothing. On the first morn
ing of carnival, the women mem
bers of her dirty block would wear
mens’jackets inside out, the men
would dress up as women, and
then we’d party the whole day long
(pp. 196-7) . . . a man in black
lingerie, garter belt and high heels
. .. more men in their wives’ cloth
ing, one with a smear of red lip
stick across his mouth. Even those
who aren’t cross-dressed sport a
sprig of rue sacred to the warrior
god O gun” (p. 213).
In rituals and festivals, inver
sions and distortions of age, sex, or
status, with the additional element
of play (burlesque, caricature, and
parody) help to give definition and
clarity to that which is considered
“norm al” in a society. By collapsing
boundaries and confusing or eras

N

ing the distinctions between the
normal and abnormal, right and
wrong, sacred and secular, the
boundaries of moral and social
codes of behavior are made clearer.

Shock and laughter
free the participants
from the harsh
realities of mundane
life.

By giving license to normally
shocking displays and violations of
social norms, festival participants
and observers are opened up to
the immediacy of experience

E

C

through shock and laughter. The
society is freed from the harsh reali
ties of m undane life and the mem
bers are renewed and transformed
through the catharsis.
In the final chapters of Samba,
Guillermoprieto describes the
shocking freedom and libertinism
of Carnival and the displays of deca
dent behavior. Carnival becomes
an opportunity for “sustained epi
sodes of intense, unambivalent joy”
(p. 195): “Black and white, dancers
and klutzes thrown together into
the same joyous mess—free, liber
ated, glamorous and hilarious at
the same time, returned to the in
nocence of pure unrestrained exhi
bitionism, posturing and primping
and wiggling our hips .. . yelling at
the top of our voices and flouncing
our backsides . . . ” (pp. 189-90).
For the reader as well, Samba,
despite its weaknesses, provides a
welcome respite from our encum
bered, everyday world. ■
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N e t w o r k o f E d u c a t o r s ’ C o m m itte e s o n C e n t r a l A m e r ic a
supporting Central Am ericans’ efforts for human rights,
social justice, and democracy by providing:
Resources on Central America

Central America in Context

Tools for teaching K-12, college and community groups;
useful for ESL, Language Arts, Spanish, Social Studies,
Regional Studies; interactive lessons, bilingual texts, histo
ries, poetry, prose. . .

Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots
of current events with strategies for teaching Central Ameri
can students and for teaching North Americans about the
region. . .

Central American Tours

Model Educational Programs

Including school visits, village stays; meetings with Minis
ters of Education, U.S. Aid officials and teachers’ union
leaders as well as exchange tours bringing Central American
educators to the U.S. . . .

The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to
bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the
classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories. . .

New Titles! Caribbean Connections, 6 Part Series!
For brochure, order forms, or information:
NECCA, Dept. H, 1118 22nd Street, NW Washington D.C. 20037 (202) 429-0137, FAX (202) 429-9766
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Newad lleteit Unite n latinAmerica
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
TomJ. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key
assumptions, including the 'Soviet or revolutionary threat,’ which have guided American foreign policy for Latin
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth)
448 pp.
$39.95

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans

This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that
have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth)
$24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper)
240pp.
$14.95

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth)
432 pp.
$34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor
Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among
various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region
during this period.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth)
256 pp.
$29.95
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T r a n c a r tin n

P llh lic h p r c

I ra n S a C llU n r u v i i s i i e r s

D ept LA 9 Rutgers-The State University,
New Brunswick, NJ 08903
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Music and Dance
by Marian Goslinga

W

ith the passing of Dame Margot Fonteyn de Arias in February 1991, the world’s attention was briefly
focused on a legend who not only personified classical dance but represented Panama (and indirectly
all of Latin America) as ambassador to Great Britain. The music and dance of Latin America were thus
propelled to a certain prominence, although these two branches of the fine arts have always been popu
lar exponents of the region’s national consciousness.

While most Latin American countries actively support the concept of a national dance company,
the BalletFolklorico de Mexico being the most famous, musical reviews are also being published all over the continent.
Among the more prestigious are the Revista musical chilena, Revista musical de Venezuela, Revista musicalpuertorriquena,
and, from Mexico, Heterofonia and Pauta.
Unfortunately for the researcher, no recent or definitive bibliography of Latin American music exists. The gather
ing of relevant information about the region’s music thus requires the perusal of many divergent sources. In answer to
this need, Malena Kuss’s Latin American Music: An Annotated Bibliography ofReference Sources and Research Materials (New
York: Garland, forthcoming) is slated to provide 3,000 entries on the topic. A preliminary version of this bibliography,
with 1,093 entries, was published as Volume IV in the “Work in Progress” series of Music in the Life of Man. A World His
tory (Paris: International Music Council, UNESCO, 1984) Until Kuss’s bibliography is published, the most comprehen
sive reference work in the field will remain the 20-volume New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (Stanley Sadie,
general editor; Gerard Behague, area editor for Latin America; London: Macmillan, 1980)
Other valuable tools for those seeking information include the series of articles by Malena Kuss and John M.
Schechter in Latin American Masses and Minorities: Their Images and Realities, volume 2 (Madison, Wis.. SALALM Secre
tariat, 1987), as well as the monthly guide, The Music Index: The Key To Current Music Periodical Literature (Detroit, Mich..
Information Services), which indexes more than 225 periodicals by subject and author In addition, the “Music” sec
tion contained in the Humanities volume of the Handbook ofLatin American Studies (Austin. University of Texas Press),
currently being compiled by Robert Stevenson, is very useful.
Last but not least, current sources of information can also be found in the Inter-American Music Review and the Latin
American Music Review, as well as Ethnomusicology’s regular section “Current Bibliography, Discography, and Filmogra
phy.” General music periodicals such as Billboard and The Village Voice also include sections featuring material specif
ically on Latin American music.
What follows is a selective list of materials on music and dance in Latin America and the Caribbean published since
1990.
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Accommodation and Resistance in
Andean Ritual Dance. Deborah A.
Poole. Drama Review, v. 34 (Sum
mer 1990), p. 98.

Barbados/Caribbean Jazz Festivals.
Michael Bourne. Down Beat (Octo
ber 1990), p. 50.

An Analysis and Adaptation of
Brazilian Folk Music into a String
Method Comparable to American
Models for Use in the Brazilian
Music Education System. Linda
Louise Kruger Ann Arbor, Mich..
University Microfilms Interna
tional, 1990. 533 p. [Thesis—Uni
versity of Missouri-Columbia.]

Brazil: A Kaleidoscope of Sound.
Mario de Aratanha. UNESCO Cou
rier (March 1991), p. 15.
Brazilian Beat Heats Orangina in
France: Musical Campaign Links
Drink to Lambada Sound. Peter S.
Green. Advertising Age (September
11,1990), p. 30.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.

The Burning Rhythms o f Haiti.
Larry Birnbaum. Spin, v. 5 (March
1990), p. 80.
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Canary Islands Bristle with the
Sounds of the Caribbean. Carlos
Agudelo. Billboard (March 17,
1990), p. 84.
Chilean Musicians’ Discourse of
the 1980’s: A Collective Poetics,
Pedagogy, and Socio-Aesthetics of
Art and Popular Music, fu a n Pablo
Gonzalez. Ann Arbor, Mich.. Univer
sity Microfilms International, 1990.
474 p. [Thesis—University of Cali
fornia, Los Angeles.]
A Comparative Study of the Exist
ing Inservice Music Programs in
Puerto Rico with the Beginning
Teacher Assistance Programs from

the States of Virginia, Florida and
Georgia. Gary Abraham Morales.
Ann Arbor, Mich.. University Micro
films International, 1990. 391 p.
[Thesis—University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.]
La danza en el Peru. A. Yori.
Monsalvat, no. 179 (February
1990), p. 28-29.
Demystifying South American
Rhythms. Jorge Morel. Guitar
Player, v. 24 (May 1990), p. 84+.
Der Tango. Stefan Gies. Musik und
Bildung, v. 22 (April 1990), p. 21315.
Ethnography of Rumba: Dance and
Social Change in Contemporary
Cuba. Yvonne La Verne Payne
Daniel. Dissertation Abstracts Interna
tional, v. 50 (April 1990), p. 3275A.
Everywhere We Go, We Are in Dan
ger: Ti Manno and the Emergence
o f a Haitian Transnational Identity.
N Glick-Schiller, G. Fouron. Ameri
can Ethnologist, v 17 (May 1990),
p. 329-47 [Ti Manno is a wellknown Haitian musician.]
The Evolution of Reggae in Jamai
ca. Lawrence McLellan,Jr InterAmerican Music Review, v. 10 (1990),
p. 51-60.

Flash Dance of the 90’s. Douglas
Mercado. Americas, v. 42 (May-June
1990), p. 3. [About the lambada.]

LA. Embraces Lambada Craze.
Michael Stremfel. Los Angeles Busi
nessJournal (March 9, 1990), p. 1

A Glimpse of Afro-Caribbean
Music in the Early Seventeenth Cen
tury. Dominique Rene de Lerma.
Black Music ResearchJournal, v. 10
(1990), p. 94-96.

The Lambada Craze. Richard
Gehr Spin, v. 6 (April 1990), p. 128.

Gracias a la vida: Das Lateinamerika-Festival in Utrecht. Ulrich
Koch, Ursula Koch. Musik und
Gesellschaft, v. 40 (May 1990), p. 25861
Grupo Corpo from Brazil Tours
U.S.A. Antonio Jose Faro. Dance
Magazine, v. 64 (November 1990),
p. 14. [About the Brazilian ballet
company.]
La guitare en Amerique latine: La
Colombie, le bambuco. Francisco
Gonzalez. Les Cahiers de la Guitare,
no. 33 (1990) , p. 14-16.
History, Analysis and Performance
Practice of the Brazilian Modinha
from the Eighteenth Century to the
Present. Maritza Helmen Freda
Mascarenhas. Ann Arbor, Mich..
University Microfilms Interna
tional, 1990. [Thesis—University of
Miami.]
It’s Hip, but Is It Happenin’?: Lam
bada’s Lot like Sex, except More
Overrated. Charles Leerhsen. News
week, v. 115 (January 29,1990),
p. 60.

Exits and Entrances: Current Craze
on the Brazilian Dance Called
Lambada. Robert Farris Thomp
son. Artforum, v. 28 (Summer
1990), p. 26.

Jamaica’s Dancehall Style Takes
Hold. Paul J. Wexler Rolling Stone,
no. 573 (March 8, 1990), p. 60.

Festival de la Habana 1989. L.
Markowski. Musik und Gesellschaft,
v. 40 (January 1990), p. 33-34.

Jazz Goes to Rio, Sao Paulo, Too.
Robin Tolleson./azz Times (January
1990), p. 10.

Lambada Hopes to Dance Its Way
into the U.S. Market. Thom Duffy,
Chris McGowan. Billboard (January
13,1990), p. 6+.
Lambada Soviet-Style. Steven
Shabard. World Press Review, v 37
(July 1990), p. 46.
Latin American Piano Music.
Enrique Alberto Arias. Clavier,
v. 30, no. 2 (1991), p. 20+.
Leaping across Frontiers. Jan
Hanvik. Americas, v. 42, no. 4
(1990), p. 56-57 [Discusses Latin
American m odern dance and the
American Dance Festival.]
Lusting for Lambada. Nicholas Jen
nings. Maclean’s, v. 103 (February
5, 1990), p. 52-53.
Mehr als Mariachis: Streifziige
durch die Musik Mexikos. Monika
Fiirst-Heidtmann, Gunthild
Heidtmann. Neue Zeitschriftfur
Musik, x. 151 (February 1990),
p. 16.
Mexican Cumba Is a Far Cry from
Its Caribbean Progenitor. Carlos
Agudelo. Billboard (May 19, 1990),
p. 56.
Michel Camilo: Caribbean Jazz
Classic. Larry Birnbaum. Down
Beat, v. 57 (March 1990), p. 24-25.
Music of Brazil: An Explosion of
Creativity from Rio to Bahia.
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Publications Update

Gerald Seligman. Stereo Review,
v. 55 (August 1990), p. 66-69.
Music: Burning Down the House.
Erik Davis. The Village Voice, v. 35
(February 13, 1990), p. 74. [Music
in Haiti.]
Music: Rub-a-dub. Julian Dibbell.
The Village Voice, v. 35 (January 30,
1990), p. 82-83. [About the lam
bada.]
Nara Leao, Brazil’s Poetess of Mod
em Song. Mark Holston. Americas,
v 42 (January-February 1990), p. 15.
On the Scene: Argentina, Alive and
Well. A. Deusebio.Jazz Forum, no.
122 (1990), p. 5. [Jazz in Argen
tina.]
Play It or Die. Phil Patton. Esquire,
v. 115, no. 3 (March 1991), p. 72.
[About music in Colombia.]
Puerto Rican Piano Music o f the
Nineteenth Century. Alberto Hector
Hernandez. Ann Arbor, Mich.. Uni
versity Microfilms International,
1990. 152 p. [Thesis—Columbia
University Teachers College.]
Research Centers and Sound Ar
chives of Traditional Music in
Latin America. E. Morenocha.
Fontes Artis Musicae, v. 37, no. 2
(1990), p. 179-91.
Roses from the South. Michael
Ponder The Strad,\, 101 (January
1990), p. 18-19. [About Argentin
ean music.]
Salsa Music: Primary Dimensions
o f Meaning in an Expressive Cul
tural Form—The Puerto Rican Ex
perience as Chronicled via Salsa
Lyric Poetics. Barbara Kay Vargas.
Ann Arbor, Mich.. University Micro
films International, 1990. [Thesis—
University of California, Irvine.]
Salsa: Puerto Rican and Latino
Music. Felix M. Padilla. Journal of
Popular Culture, v. 24 (Summer
1990), p. 87
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Scambada: Dirty Dancing All the
Way to the Bank. Richard Gold.
Variety, v. 338 (March 1990), p. 1+.
[About the lambada dance craze in
Brazil.]
The Secret o f Good Latin Jazz.
Charles Gerard. Jazz EducatorsJour
nal, v. 22 (1990), p. 63-65.
The Sound of Brazil: Follow the
Music and Let It Guide You to the
Heart o f the Country. John Krich.
The New York Times Magazine, v. 140
(October 21,1990), p. 28, col. 1.
South of the Border: A Caballo.
John Santos. Modem Drummer, v. 14
(March 1990), p. 72.
Speaking in Tongues. Craig
Bromberg. Rolling Stone (January
11,1990), p. 48-49.
Stagium Battles Social Ills. Robert
Johnson. Dance Magazine, v. 65,
no. 3 (March 1991), p. 13. [About
Mark Gidali and Decio Otero,
founders of Brazil’s Stagium dance
company.]
Structure, Context, and Strategy in
Musical Ethnography. Thomas
Turino. Ethnomusicology, v. 34, no. 3
(Fall 1990), p. 399-412. [Specifi

cally refers to the Fiesta de la Cruz
in Conima, Peru.]
A Theory on the Origin of the
Organ’s Quintadena. Ralph
Blakeley. The Musical Times, v. 131
(March 1990), p. 163+. [About the
history of traditional Peruvian
organ music.]
Tito Puente: King o f the Middle
World. Fred Bouchard. Down Beat
(May 1991), p. 20-21
Tow to Tango. Rob Prince. Folk
Roots, no. 83 (May 1990), p. 31+.
Uptown Dominica (Merengue).
Daisann McLane. Spin, v. 6 (May
1990), p. 86.
With Guiros and Maracas: Hispanic
Christian Music in a Charismatic
Church. Milagros Agostini
Quesada. The Hymn, v. 41 (1990),
p. 30-33.
The Women of Merengue. Mark
Holston. Americas, v. 42 (May-June
1990), p. 54. [About women musi
cians in Latin America.]
Worldstyle: Wasting Away in
Lambadaville. Lee Jeske. Cash Box,
v. 53 (February 17,1990), p. 9.

New Publication
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER

The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment:
Opportunities and Obstacles
Edited by M ark B. Rosenberg
Prominent scholars and policymakers analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the
likely impact of a North American free trade agreement and a single European market and
the roles of Japan and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
165 pp.
$11.95 (paperback)

Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University,
University Park, Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 348-2894; Fax (305) 348-3593.
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